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Using global cross-ownership data, we find return predictability for four possible cases in 
ownership-linked firms (OLFs): subsidiary−parent, parent−subsidiary, subsidiary−subsidiary, and 
parent−parent. A long/short portfolio strategy sorted by the lagged monthly returns of OLFs 
yields the monthly Fama-French six-factor alpha of 79−113 bps. These results, which are 
observed only after the establishment of ownership links, are not subsumed by industry or 
cross-country momentums or by alternative inter-firm relations, including customer−supplier 
links, strategic alliances, common boards, and shared analyst coverage. The OLF return 
predictability is best explained by active internal capital markets—a mechanism unique to firms 
with a complex ownership network. 
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Stock return predictability is among the most widely studied phenomena that challenge the notion 
of efficient capital markets. Despite the richness of past research on return predictabilities or 
cross-sectional return anomalies based on hundreds of firm characteristics,1 the question whether 
the ownership network can drive return predictability among ownership-linked firms (thereafter 
refers to as OLFs) remains open. A major challenge in addressing this question is that OLFs can 
have other ties among themselves, such as various economic links and common board members 
that are not necessarily related to their ownership network. In this paper, we address this 
challenge using a global cross-ownership data panel and exploring the mechanisms that are 
unique to OLFs. 
In contrast to the usual simple ownership of US firms where one parent (subsidiary) firm 
may have only one subsidiary (parent), globally, publicly listed parent firms tend to have a more 
complex ownership structure where parent firms frequently have multi-layer and multi-country 
subsidiaries (La Porta et al., 1999; Bertrand and Sendhil, 2003). In this setting, information 
transmission delays and associated return predictability can occur across four ownership 
structures (see Figure 1). The first two structures—namely, subsidiary−parent and 
parent−subsidiary—are vertical and can be directly or indirectly connected to each other. The 
second two structures—namely, subsidiary−subsidiary, connected through common parent firms, 
and parent−parent, connected through common subsidiaries—are horizontal and can be directly 
or indirectly connected to each other.2 The two vertical structures with direct links are the only 
possible ones for a simple one-parent−one-subsidiary ownership case. The two horizontal 
structures and all indirect configurations are additional possibilities that exist only in a complex 
multi-parent−multi-subsidiary ownership network and, therefore, are essential for a better 
understanding of the drivers of predictability. For instance, firms with complex ownership links 
frequently have significant internal capital market activities, which are not always optimal and 
 
1 For the long list of such anomalies and their chronology, see Harvey et al. (2016). 
2 Within horizontal ownership structures, a direct link is assumed when two subsidiaries are directly connected to a 
common parent firm or when two parent firms are directly connected to a common subsidiary. 
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value-enhancing (Stulz, 1990; Meyer et al., 1992; Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998) and may 
lead to delayed information diffusion into stock prices (Hong and Stein, 1999; 2007). Therefore, 
complex ownership structure makes it possible to investigate the mechanisms unique to OLFs, 
such as active internal capital markets, as an opportunity to directly examine whether ownership 
links can induce cross-firm return predictability. In addition, a substantially larger cross-section 
of ownership connection configurations can help to more confidently determine the probable 
sources of any ownership-linked predictability. 
In this paper, we examine return predictability among OLFs using a global sample across 
23 developed markets in 2006−2018; after data filtering, the sample contains 2,052 parent firms 
and 3,664 subsidiaries. We observe return predictability in all four possible cases of ownership 
network—namely, parent−subsidiary, subsidiary−parent, subsidiary−subsidiary, and parent− 
parent. Based on this global sample of firms with complex ownership structure, we propose two 
mechanisms specific to OLFs: (1) ownership complexity (as a type of firm information 
complexity) and (2) active internal capital markets (ICMs) that may induce return predictability 
in OLFs. ICMs dominate all other mechanisms, including two commonly used 
explanations—investors’ inattention and limits to arbitrage—in explaining return predictability in 
OLFs.  
We find that subsidiaries’ information has a significant predictive ability for parent firm’s 
future stock returns. World-wide, the Fama and French (2018) six-factor alpha is on average 113 
bps (t-statistic = 3.66) per month: it is the difference between the value-weighted parent firms’ 
portfolio alpha with the highest past month return of ownership-weighted subsidiaries’ portfolio 
and that with the lowest past month return of ownership-weighted subsidiaries’ portfolio. To test 
parent−subsidiary return predictability, we apply the following strategy. For each subsidiary in a 
given month, we calculate the control-weighted portfolio return of parent firms that own the 
subsidiary with at least 20% stakes. Next, we sort subsidiaries into quintile portfolios using the 
returns earned by a portfolio of their parent firms in the previous month. We find that the lagged 
parent firms’ portfolio return predicts the next month subsidiaries’ return. Specifically, a portfolio 
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long in subsidiaries, i.e. whose parent firms showed the best performance in the previous month, 
and short in subsidiaries, i.e. whose parent firms performed the worst in the previous month, 
yields the value-weighted monthly six-factor alpha of 77 bps (t-statistic = 2.54). A similar 
approach yields the same monthly alphas of subsidiary−subsidiary and parent−parent return 
predictabilities of 76 bps and 79 bps, respectively. Over a period of four to five months, all four 
types of OLF return predictabilities monotonically decrease to zero. 
The results of multivariate Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression tests with various 
firm-, industry-, and country-level control variables show that the predictive relationship between 
past-month returns of OLFs and next-month returns of the focal firm retains its economic and 
statistical significance for all four types of ownership links. Furthermore, we show that the new 
predictability phenomenon is not subsumed by industry or cross-country momentums or by 
various alternative inter-firm relations, including customer−supplier links, strategic alliance 
partners, common institutional investors, common board members, and shared analyst coverage. 
We also observe the largest predictability for the subsidiary−parent link and the lowest 
predictability for the parent−parent link, which may be due to the relative strength of the 
ownership connection across the four types of links. Finally, OLFs show predictability not only 
for firms’ returns, but also for their fundamental performance metrics, such as the focal firm’s 
unexpected earnings. This indicates that, due to the complicated information processing across 
OLFs, the impact of news (unexpected earnings) of OLFs on the earnings of the focal firm may 
not be fully digested by the financial analysts of the focal firm; therefore, the unexpected 
earnings of OLFs can predict the earnings surprises of the focal firm. 
To address endogeneity concerns, we analyze return predictability of OLFs around the 
changes in the cross-firm ownership structure. To this end, we use the difference-in-difference 
method and a four-year time window comprising two years before and two years after the event. 
Our expectation is that OLFs would exhibit return predictability only after the formation of 
cross-firm ownership links. We divide the sample into two groups: while the “treatment” group 
comprises all cases where a firm without an ownership link transitions into a firm with an 
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ownership link, the “control” group of firms includes companies without ownership changes. The 
two groups are then matched by industry and based on the following four firm characteristics: 
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, asset growth, and gross profitability. In line with our 
expectations, our results reveal the existence of return predictability after changes in ownership 
only in the treatment group, i.e. for those firms that form ownership links. We do not observe 
return predictability of OLFs in the control group either before or after the (pseudo) date of 
change in ownership links. 
These empirical results are consistent with the ex-ante expected return predictability due 
to the expectedly complicated information processing across OLFs with ICMs. For instance, 
Berger and Ofek (1995) showed that several ICM activities, such as overinvestment and 
cross-subsidization, decrease information processing efficiency. However, we additionally 
consider four other mechanisms that also could potentially affect the phenomenon of return 
predictability in OLFs. The first of these four mechanisms is the investors’ limited attention 
(Huang, 2015; Lee et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2020). The second mechanism is limits to 
arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The third is the commonality of decision making in OLFs, 
which may result from common board members (Burt et al., 2020), common institutional 
investors (Gao et al., 2017), or shared analysts (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2020). Finally, the fourth 
additional mechanism is ownership complexity of focal firms, which is a type of information 
complexity associated with firm complexity (Daniel et al. 1998; 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Cohen 
and Lou, 2012). Of the aforementioned five mechanisms, limited attention and limits to arbitrage 
are two generic mechanisms commonly used in the predictability literature, while ICM and 
ownership complexity are the mechanisms that are unique to the ownership network context and 
that are newly proposed in this study. Commonality of decision making is another newly 
proposed mechanism. In subsequent individual tests and horseraces among the above five 
potential reasons, we find that,  focal firms exhibit a slow price response to their OLF returns 
mostly due to active ICMs, and, in part, owing to the complexity of ownership structure itself. We 
further substantiate the predominant role of ICMs in explaining return predictability in OLFs by 
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showing their importance particularly for OLFs located in countries with more opaque capital 
markets and a weaker rule of law.  
Return predictability among firms with economic links is well documented in previous 
research. For instance, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) evaluated predictability between customers 
and suppliers. Furthermore, Huang (2015) and Finke and Weigert (2017) established that 
information from foreign operations gradually dilutes into stock prices of multinational firms. 
Likewise, Cao et al. (2016) found that strategic alliance firm partners exhibits return 
predictability. However, economic and ownership links are different in their nature. Specifically, 
while economic links refer to the firm’s supply chain network and reflect the firm’s sales and 
operations activities, ownership links refer to the company’s shareholding network, reflecting the 
company’s investment and financing status. Along with potential economic and business 
activities, firms within the ownership network may also have other complex and opaque 
relationships. For instance, ICM activities, such as overinvestment or cross-subsidization, can 
complicate investors’ understanding of information from firms linked to each other through 
complex ownership.  
Return predictability in firms with a complex ownership network remains poorly 
understood. For instance, Li et al. (2016)—to the best of our knowledge, the only concurrent 
study on a similar subject – documented that the lagged returns of US local subsidiaries (parent 
firms) can predict returns of US parent firms (subsidiaries). Of note, however, our study differs 
from Li et al. (2016) in two important dimensions. First, observing return predictability across 
OLFs does not imply that it is driven by the ownership network itself, since it may result from 
economic or other links across firms. In this respect, Li et al. (2016) showed that, once the 
intra-industry lead-lag relation is controlled for, their parent-subsidiary return predictability 
disappears. While many previous studies adopted such indirect approach of accounting for 
alternative explanations of cross-firm return predictability, this approach always leaves the 
possibility that other unaccounted links are driving the results. In contrast, we not only use the 
usual indirect approach to show that economic links do not drive our findings, but also provide 
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the ownership network-based mechanisms, such as the ICM activities, and show that these 
mechanisms can directly explain return predictability in OLFs. Together, our results based on 
using direct and indirect approaches confirm the parent-subsidiary return predictability, implying 
that Li et al.’s (2016) results may be fragile. The second dimension of difference between our 
study and Li et al. (2016) is that, unlike Li et al. (2016), we also examine return predictability in 
OLFs for all four possible cases of ownership network, including subsidiary−subsidiary and 
parent−parent.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical 
methodology. Section 3 reports the results of the univariate analysis of return predictability in 
OLFs. Section 4 presents our main tests in a multivariate framework. In this section, we also 
analyze changes in the OLF return predictability in response to ownership link changes. Section 5 
discusses the mechanisms to explain return predictability in OLFs. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Predictors 
In this section, we describe our global ownership data sample and introduce OLF predictors for 
the four types of OLFs. We also provide the summary statistics for parent firms and subsidiaries. 
 
2.1. Data 
Our sample covers parent firms and subsidiaries from 23 developed markets defined by Fama and 
French (2012; 2017) and for which risk factors are available in the K. French library. These 
markets include 2 North American markets (Canada and the United States), 16 European markets 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), Japan, and 4 
Asia-Pacific markets (Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand, and Singapore). We collect 
price, volume, and return data for US firms and non-US firms from the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) and Refinitiv Eikon, respectively. Institutional ownership data and 
analyst coverage for all firms in the sample come from FactSet Ownership and Refinitiv I/B/E/S, 
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respectively. We also collect ownership links and shareholding percentages data from the merged 
Orbis-FactSet database.3 Since FactSet provides the data from 1999, while Orbis’ data are 
available only from 2005, the starting year of the merged dataset is set to 2005. The total number 
of available distinct parent firms and subsidiaries from the Orbis-FactSet database is 3,862 and 
8,970, respectively.4 To avoid market microstructure problems, stocks with prices below $5 are 
excluded from the analyses. We cover all industrial firms and exclude the financial sector (with 
two-digit NAICS code = 52). The sample period is from January 2006 to December 2018 and 
contains a total of 156 monthly observations. All stock returns are denominated in US dollars. To 
calculate monthly excess returns in all markets, we use the one-month US T-bill rate.  
Since our aim is to examine return predictability in ownership networks, there should be a 
reasonable cut-off for ownership stakes. In previous studies, La Porta et al. (2000) set at least 10% 
voting rights to define a large ownership stake, while Claessens et al. (2000) used a 20% cut-off. 
Furthermore, based on recent updates to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for 
publicly traded firms, a company is assumed to have a significant influence in another company 
if its ownership in that company is no less than 20%.5 Accordingly, we also use 20 percent of 
ownership as a cut-off.6 To test the OLF return predictability from January 2006 to December 
2018, we collect 13 annual time-varying ownership links from 2005 to 2017. The resulting 
sample contains a total of 2,052 parent firms and 3,664 subsidiaries. 
  
 
3 We cross-validate the ownership links and shareholding data in Orbis and FactSet—the two main data sources that 
provide ownership links and shareholding percentages. Instead of using either one of these datasets separately, we 
merge them. This is done for the following reasons. Firstm, while Orbis provides detailed parent and subsidiaries 
information for each focal firm, their shareholding percentages are not always numerical. Second, although FactSet 
only provides the main owner/parent firm to each focal firm, their shareholding percentages are numerical. Therefore, 
the merged dataset uses the advantages of both data sources and starts from 2006. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 
(2015), we decode non-numeric indicators of percentage shares owned by a parent firm. 
4 The US-based sample used by Li et al. (2016) before filtering contains 543 parent firms and 732 subsidiaries. 
However, after filtering, Li et al. (2016) obtained a stock sample of “28,101 distinct parent-month observations”. 
Since their stock sample period was 26 years (1985-2010), the average number of parent firms each month was 90, 
which is also the number of observations in Column (1) of Table 6 in Li et al. (2016) and similar to that in our US 
subsample. Consequently, Li et al. (2016) used only about 18 firms in each quintile portfolio, which raises the 
possibility of non-systematic risks in such under-diversified portfolios. 
5 See http://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-28-investments-in-associates-and-joint-ventures. 
6 We also use the ownership cut-off levels of 10%, 15%, 25%, and 30%; however, our main findings remain intact. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559099
8 
 
2.2. Four predictors of ownership-linked firms 
The first regressor of interest to us is the one month lagged return of subsidiaries, !"#!,#$%, 
which is constructed as the ownership-weighted portfolio returns of all subsidiaries of parent firm 
$ (see Eq. (1)): 
!"#!,#$% =	∑ ()*!,&,#$% × +&,#$%& ,                  (1) 
where ()*!,&,#$%  is parent firm $’s ownership stake in subsidiary , in month 	- − 1, and 
+&,#$% is the subsidiary ,’s return in month - − 1. ()*!,&,#$% is defined as:  
()*!,&,#$% =
!ℎ1234567!,&,#$% 	× 	!$83&,#$%
	∑ !ℎ1234567!,&,#$%	 × 	!$83&,#$%&
, 
where !ℎ1234567!,&,#$% is parent firm $’s shareholding percentages in subsidiary , in month 
- − 1, and !$83&,#$% is the market capitalization of subsidiary , in month - − 1. Let us assume 
that a parent firm : has two subsidiaries in its first layer, !1 and !2, while !1 also has a 
subsidiary !11 in its first layer. Then, !11 is the second-layer subsidiary for parent firm :. 
Then let us suppose that the market capitalizations of :, !1, !2, and !11 are 200 million, 100 
million, 50 million, and 50 million, respectively. In addition, parent firm : has shareholdings of 
60% and 100% in !1 and !2, respectively, while !1 has a shareholding of 50% in !11. Said 
differently, : has a shareholding of 30% in !11. Then, the subsidiaries predictor, !"#!,#$%, is 
calculated as follows: 
!"#!,#$% =	
60%	 × 100 × +(%,#$% + 	100% × 50 × +(),#$% + 30% × 50 × +(%%,#$%
60% × 100 + 	100% × 50 + 30% × 50 . 
The second regressor of interest to us is the one month lagged return of parent 
firms,	:12!,#$%, constructed here as the control-weighted portfolio returns of all parent firms of 
subsidiary $ (see Eq. (2)): 
:12!,#$% =	∑ C5*-256!,&,#$% × +&,#$%& ,               (2) 
where C5*-256!,&,#$% is subsidiary $’s stake controlled by parent firm , in month - − 1, and 
+&,#$% is parent firm ,’s return in month - − 1, while C5*-256!,&,#$% is defined as: 







where !ℎ1234567	!,&,#$% is subsidiary $’s shareholding percentages controlled by parent firm , 
in month - − 1. Let is suppose some subsidiary ! has two parent firms in the first layer, :1 
and :2, while :1 also has a parent firm :11 in its first layer. Then, :11 is the second-layer 
parent firm for subsidiary !. Let is suppose that :1 holds a 30% stake in !, :2 holds 20% 
stakes of ! , while :11  has a 50% shareholding in :1 . Said differently, :11  has a 
shareholding of 15% in !. Then, the subsidiaries predictor, :12!,#$%, is calculated as: 
:12!,#$% =	
30%	 × +*%,#$% + 	20%	 × +*),#$% + 15%	 × +*%%,#$%
30% + 	20% + 15% . 
Finally, the third and fourth predictors are the one month lagged returns of sister 
subsidiaries, !$D_!"#!,#$%, which are subsidiaries with common parent firms, and sister parent 
firms, !$D_:12!,#$%, which are parent firms with common subsidiaries. These two predictors are 
straightforwardly constructed based on the value-weighted portfolio returns of sister subsidiaries 
of subsidiary $ and sister parent firms of parent firm $, respectively (see Eqs. (3)-(4)): 
!$D_!"#!,#$% = ∑ )!,&,#$%+&,#$%& ,               (3) 
and 
!$D_:12!,#$% = ∑ )!,&,#$%+&,#$%& ,               (4) 
where )!,&,#$% is subsidiary (parent firm) $’s sister subsidiary (parent firm) ,’s weight in month 
- − 1, and +&,#$% is sister subsidiary (parent firm) ,’s return in month - − 1.7  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for listed parent firms and subsidiaries from 23 
developed markets. Firm characteristics include firm’s market capitalization, book-to-market 
ratio, asset growth, gross profitability, and momentum. All variables are defined in the Appendix 
and are winsorized within each cross-section at 1% and 99% levels. Panel A reports the full 
 
7 Note that any of the four ownership links can be either direct or indirect. A parent firm (subsidiary) is directly 
linked to a subsidiary (parent firm) if they are connected without an intermediate subsidiary (a parent firm). Similarly, 
sister subsidiaries (sister parent firms) are directly linked if they are connected through a parent firm (a subsidiary) 
without any intermediate subsidiary (a parent firm). 
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sample summary statistics of parent and subsidiary firms and for the four types of OLFs: 
subsidiary−parent (Sub−Par), parent−subsidiary (Par−Sub), subsidiary−subsidiary (Sub−Sub), 
and parent−parent (Par−Par). The average numbers of parent firms and subsidiaries in our sample 
are 1,287 and 2,208, respectively. Each parent (subsidiary) firm has two subsidiaries (one parent 
firm) in the median. Similarly, the median number of sister subsidiaries (parent firms) is two 
(one). However, the maximum number of subsidiaries for a given parent firm is nine, while the 
maximum number of parent firms for a given subsidiary is four.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports country-level statistics on the number of parent firms and 
subsidiaries, as well as the average number of sister subsidiaries and sister parent firms. Columns 
1-2 show the yearly average number of parent firms and subsidiaries in each country, while 
Columns 3-4 show the average number of subsidiary−parent and parent−subsidiary links in each 
country, respectively. Columns 5-6 show the average number of links between sister subsidiaries 
and sister parent firms in each country, respectively. The largest number of both parent firms and 
subsidiaries—476 and 949, respectively—are in Japan, followed by France (132 parent firms and 
217 subsidiaries). Japanese firms also have the largest average number of subsidiaries per parent 
firm and parent firms per subsidiary—3.50 and 1.93, respectively. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the five firm characteristics for parent 
firms and subsidiaries. We can see that, on average, parent firms are more than six-fold larger 
than subsidiaries. The other four firm characteristics for parent firms and subsidiaries are almost 
identical—except for average and median momentum, which is over 50% larger for subsidiaries 
than parent firms. This finding is consistent with the understanding that, due to less efficient 
pricing, smaller firms show a higher momentum as compared to larger firms. 
 
3. Univariate Analysis  
This section reports univariate analysis of stock return predictability in a complex ownership 
network. Our aim is to examine cross-sectional variation in expected returns of OLFs in response 
to a common predictor. We start with one-period return predictability tests on the full data sample. 
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We then also perform long-term predictability tests. 
 
3.1. Univariate portfolio sort tests of short-term OLF return predictability 
First, we examine the existence of the following four OLF return predictability patterns: 
subsidiary−parent, parent−subsidiary, subsidiary−subsidiary, and parent−parent. To accomplish 
this for each month -, we rank parent firm (or subsidiary) returns based on the ranking of their 
subsidiaries’ (or parent firms’) portfolio returns in month - − 1. Similarly, for each month -, we 
rank subsidiary (or parent firm) returns based on the ranking of their sister subsidiaries’ (or sister 
parent firms’) portfolio returns in month - − 1. In the next step, we classify parent firm (or 
subsidiary) stocks into five quintiles where Quintile 1 has the lowest lagged subsidiaries’ (or 
parent firms’) portfolio returns, while Quintile 5 has the highest lagged subsidiaries’ (or parent 
firms’) portfolio returns. Then, we report the value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolio 
returns of the lowest and highest quintiles, as well as the hedged portfolio returns of Quintile 5 
minus Quintile 1 (i.e. Q5–Q1) with the corresponding statistical significance level. 
Table 2 reports the test results of value- and equally-weighted univariate portfolio sorts for 
four types of return predictabilities in OLFs using the excess and risk-adjusted returns. Panel A 
shows the excess returns for all five quintile portfolios, as well as the results for the Q5-Q1 
difference portfolio. Column 1 in Panel A shows that the excess returns of parent firm stocks with 
the highest lagged one month returns of subsidiaries’ portfolio is significantly higher than the 
corresponding values with the lowest lagged one month returns of subsidiaries’ portfolio. The 
value-weighted parent firms’ stocks in the highest quintile earn an average monthly excess return 
of 99 bps, as compared to that of –19 (i.e. negative 19) bps for the value-weighted parent firms’ 
stocks in the lowest quintile. The return spread is 118 bps, and it is significant at the 1% level. 
The equally-weighted portfolio return spread is 143 bps and again has 1% significance level. 
Columns 2-4 show similar evidence for both value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios of 
predictor firms’ returns across the remaining three OLF return predictability directions. The 
value-weighted spread is 97 bps in the parent−subsidiary case, 85 bps in subsidiary−subsidiary 
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case, and 103 bps in the parent−parent case. 
In Panel B, we use a global version of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. 
Column 1 shows that the five-factor alpha (a_FF5) of parent firm stocks with the highest lagged 
one month returns of subsidiaries’ portfolio is significantly higher than the corresponding values 
with the lowest lagged one month returns of subsidiaries’ portfolio. The value-weighted parent 
firms’ stocks in the highest quintile earn the average monthly a_FF5 of 30 bps, as compared to 
that of –83 (i.e. negative 83) bps for the value-weighted parent firms’ stocks in the lowest quintile. 
The return spread is 113 bps, and it is significant at the 1% level. The equally-weighted portfolio 
return spread is 122 bps and has the same 1% significance level. Columns 2-4 provide similar 
evidence for both value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios of predictor firms’ returns 
across the remaining three OLF return predictability directions. The value-weighted spread is 82 
bps, 73 bps, and 88 bps in the parent−subsidiary, subsidiary−subsidiary, and parent−parent cases, 
respectively. 
Finally, in Panel C of Table 2, we use the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model to 
capture abnormal returns. The Fama and French (2018) six-factor model adds a momentum factor 
into the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. After this change, the value-weighted and 
equally-weighted portfolio risk-adjusted returns (a_FF6) of the subsidiary−parent predictability 
become 113 bps and 126 bps, respectively. The value-weighted spreads for parent−subsidiary, 
subsidiary−subsidiary, and parent−parent OLF return predictability directions are 77 bps, 76 bps, 
and 79 bps per month, respectively. Taken together, the results in Table 2 demonstrate the 
economically and statistically significant return predictability among firms with ownership links.8 
 
3.2. Univariate portfolio sort tests of long-term OLF return predictability 
It is important to understand whether or not the observed predictability lasts several periods after 
the formation of the corresponding OLF portfolios. To explore this possibility, in Table 3, we 
 
8 In the Internet Appendix, we report the results of the OLF return predictability tests across time periods and 
different geographic regions and find highly statistically significant results in all these tests. 
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show the long-term portfolio alphas of value-weighted univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms for 
all four types of return predictabilities in OLFs. The table reports monthly risk-adjusted return 
from two to six months ahead after the portfolio formation. Panel A provides the abnormal 
returns for the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
model, a_FF5. We observe a monotonic decrease in economic and statistical predictability over 
time across all four types of ownership links. Some statistical evidence of predictability (at the 10% 
level) for the subsidiary−parent case remains up until the month- + 5, while that for the other 
three types of ownership links persists up to month - + 4. 
Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama 
and French (2018) six-factor model, a_FF6. Overall, the predictability patterns are similar to 
those in Panel A of Table 3. Specifically, across all columns of the table we again observe a 
steady decrease in the OLF return predictability. However, the decrease in predictability is less 
steep. While we still observe marginal predictability in subsidiary−parent and parent−subsidiary 
cases in month - + 6, that for subsidiary−subsidiary and parent−parent cases lasts until month 
- + 5, rather than until month - + 4 as in the previous panel. In summary, the results of 
univariate tests in Tables 2 and 3 provide a consistent picture of the existence of short-term return 
predictability in OLF that dissipates over the course of several months.9 
 
4. Multivariate Analysis  
In this section, we use Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regressions to analyze whether stock return 
predictability within ownership networks remains robust after controlling for major risk factors 
and different firm characteristics. We then demonstrate that the OLF predictability is also present 
for focal firm’s fundamental performance metrics. In addition, we address the endogeneity 
concerns that could influence our results on return predictability in OLFs. 
 
 
9 In the Internet Appendix, we report the results of univariate test based on risk-adjusted returns and long-term 
portfolio alphas as in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, but with Burt and Hrdlicka’s (2020) adjustment. This adjustment 
does not considerably affect our results. 
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4.1. Multivariate regressions of OLF return predictability 
The stock level’s Fama-MacBeth regression consists of the following two steps. In the first step, 
we use cross-sectional regression in each month as following: 
23-!,# =	G+,# + G%,,,#	+G),-,# + 	G.,#	(HI!,#$% +	G/,#
0	J!,#$% +	K!,#,          (5) 
where 23-!,#is the excess return of focal firm’s stock $ in month -; G%,,,#	is a country-specific 
dummy variable, equal to one if focal firm $ is from country L, and zero otherwise; G),-,#	is a 
industry-specific dummy variable, equal to one if focal firm $ is in industry 7, and zero 
otherwise (using two-digit NAICS codes); (HI!,#$%	 is one of the lagged return 
predictors—namely, !"#!,#$% , :12!,#$% , !$D_!"#!,#$% , and !$D_:12!,#$%  in different 
specifications. The control vector of lagged variables, J!,#$%, includes H*(!$83), the log of firm 
size; H*(O/Q), the log of book-to-market equity ratio; return momentum, Q5R, the cumulative 
return of stock $ from month - − 12 to month - − 2 (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993); +!,#$%, 
the stock return of focal firm $ in month	- − 1; Turnover, the number of shares traded divided by 
the number of shares outstanding during a day, averaged over the past 12 months (Rouwenhorst, 
1999); asset growth, ST, the year-over-year growth rate of total assets (Cooper et al., 2008); 
gross profitability, T:, the revenue minus cost of goods sold scaled by assets (Novy-Marx, 2013); 
and industry momentum, U*7_Q5R (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). To compute standard 
errors, we use the Newey-West adjustment with six lags.10 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the tests based on the multivariate regressions, including 
the point estimates, their absolute t-statistics, as well as the number of observations and the 
adjusted R-squared. Panel A shows estimations across the four types of the OLF predictability 
directions based on focal firms’ excess returns as the dependent variable. The results in this panel 
demonstrate that all four OLF predictors—namely, !"#!,#$% , :12!,#$% , !$D_!"#!,#$% , and 
!$D_:12!,#$%—are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for their respective 
dependent variables, i.e. the excess returns of parent, subsidiary, sister subsidiary and sister 
 
10 The choice of the lag length from 1 to 12 does not influence the statistical significance of any of the tests.  
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parent firms. In line with our expectation, in economic terms, return predictability is stronger 
among the firms with closer vertical ownership links, such as subsidiary−parent, followed by 
parent−subsidiary, and weaker for the firms with more distant horizontal ownership links, such as 
subsidiary−subsidiary and especially parent−parent. While explaining the relative strength of 
return predictability between the first two vertical ownership connection cases may be difficult, 
understanding the weakest predictability evidence for the horizontal parent-parent link is more 
straightforward. In this case, on average two larger firms are ownership-connected only through a 
much smaller company, their common subsidiary (see Table 1, Panel C). Therefore, for such 
connection, regardless of the underlying source of information delay between the two constituent 
ownership links—namely, from one large parent firm to a small subsidiary or from the same 
subsidiary to the second large parent firm—its strength should ultimately be lower than that over 
the two separate links. Of note, the predictive power of all four lagged OLF returns is not 
subsumed by the control variables. 
Panels B and C of Table 4 report similar estimations using risk-adjusted returns as 
dependent variables. The risk-adjusted returns (alphas) for focal firm $  in month -  are 
computed as the difference between focal firm $’s excess return and its expected factor returns 
based on the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model (Panel B) and the Fama and French 
(2018) six-factor model (Panel C) in month - , a_FF5, and a_FF6, respectively. In our 
estimations, we use regional risk factors, QV-, !R#, 4R6 , +R) , CR1, and Q5R from 
Kenneth French’s website.11 Following Fama and French (1992), Cao et al. (2016), and Finke 
and Weigert (2017), we calculate factor loadings for each focal firm using a time-series 
regression over the entire sample period.12 For the sake of conciseness, we omit reporting the 
estimates of control variables in these two panels. Overall, the results are similar to those in Panel 
A of Table 4. Again, all four OLF predictors— !"#!,#$% , :12!,#$% , !$D_!"#!,#$% , and 
!$D_:12!,#$%—are positive and significant at the 1% level prediction ability for the risk-adjusted 
 
11 https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
12 We obtain similar results using rolling estimates. 
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returns (a_FF5, and a_FF6) of parent, subsidiary, sister subsidiary, and sister parent firms. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the corresponding point estimates is only marginally smaller than 
those in Panel A for excess returns. In addition, as can be seen Panel A, the largest predictability 
is recorded for the subsidiary−parent link, while the lowest – for the parent−parent one (in Panel 
C, the coefficients on !"#!,#$%	and !$D_:12!,#$%	are 3.02 and 1.03, respectively). Therefore, 
similarly to the results of univariate tests, the multivariate regressions setting also provides 
evidence of a strong predictive effect of the lagged returns of OLFs for stock returns of focal 
firms, both excess and risk-adjusted.13 
A reader might suggest that firm’s ownership links pick up alternative links between firms, 
such as supplier−customer relations, strategic alliance partners, common board members, shared 
analyst coverage, and so forth. Therefore, it may be assumed that the observed return 
predictability in OLFs simply reflects the predictability effects reported in earlier studies. Due to 
the scarcity of international data on inter-firm linkages, we address this concern in the following 
two ways (see the Internet Appendix).  
First, we repeat univariate and multivariate estimations on the sample of financial firms 
from 23 developed markets. These firms differ from those in all other industries by their lack of 
any explicit economic linkages. Our test results are similar to those in Panel C of Tables 2 and 4, 
implying that OLF return predictability in OLFs does not require any direct economic links 
among firms with ownership links. 
Second, we repeat our estimations in Table 4 on the US firm sample only, for which 
various inter-firm data are available. In this sample, there is no parent−parent case and only 19 
subsidiary−subsidiary cases, which limit our estimations to only two ownership links: 
subsidiary−parent and parent−subsidiary.14  The independent variables accounting for other 
 
13 We also re-run the tests in Table 4 with an addition of cross-country momentum proxy—namely, the lagged 
return on the equally-weighted equity market indices from the OLF countries. This alteration has negligible impact 
on our findings in all estimations. These results are available upon request. In the Internet Appendix, we also report 
univariate and multivariate test results of OLF return predictability for firms from 26 emerging markets. 
14 For instance, we find that only four out of 109 subsidiaries are customers of their parent firms, and only 10 out of 
90 parent firms are customers to their subsidiaries. 
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inter-firm relations added to the tests are as follows: (1) the lagged supplier industry momentum 
of the focal firm; (2) the lagged customer industry momentum of the focal firm (Menzly and 
Ozbas, 2010); (3) the lagged customer momentum of the focal firm (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008); 
(4) the lagged pseudo-conglomerate portfolio return of the focal firm (Cohen and Lou, 2012); (5) 
the lagged strategic alliance partners’ portfolio return of the focal firm (Cao et al., 2016); (6) the 
lagged technological partners’ portfolio return of the focal firm (Lee et al., 2019); (7) the lagged 
average return of all other stocks headquartered in the same city of US 20 largest cities (Parsons 
et al., 2020); (8) the lagged weighted-average return of stocks connected through common board 
members with the focal firm (Burt et al., 2020); (9) the lagged weighted-average return of stocks 
connected through the common analyst coverage with the focal firm (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2020); 
and (10) the lagged weighted-average return of stocks connected through common institutional 
investors with the focal firm (Gao et al., 2017). 
We successively conduct the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions on the excess 
returns of focal firms in the presence of each of the aforementioned alternative inter-firm 
momentum variables. The test results show that the two OLF predictors for the US firm 
sample—namely, !"#!,#$%  and :12!,#$% , retain their economic importance and statistical 
significance at least at the 5% level in all estimations for subsidiary−parent and parent−subsidiary 
predictability tests, respectively, implying implies that return predictability in OLFs cannot be 
subsumed by other inter-firm effects. 
 
4.2. Forecasting fundamental performance metrics 
In this section, we seek to understand whether predictability exists not only for OLF stock returns, 
but also for their fundamental performance metrics.15 Said differently, we aim to find out 
whether OLFs are fundamentally interrelated. To explore this possibility, we test whether OLFs 
predict standardized unexpected earnings (SUEs) of focal firms. Of note, since SUEs capture 
 
15 We also find that OLFs exhibit predictability for focal firms’ cash flows, profits, ROA, revenues, and sales (see 
the Internet Appendix). 
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unanticipated changes in the focal firm’s earnings and are not return-based, these test results are 
not confounded by measurement error or omitted risk factors. 
In Table 5, we examine whether OLF returns can forecast the focal firm’s future SUEs 
using the Fama-MacBeth regression setting. Panel A reports the overall results for one-quarter 
predictability for the four OLF investment strategies. The dependent variable is !WX!,#, i.e. the 
unexpected earnings of focal firm $ at time -, which is winsorized in the cross-section at the 1% 
and 99% levels. The independent variable of interest is the one-quarter lagged return of OLFs. 
This variable is computed from the preceding three months. Along with standard firm controls 
from Table 4 and country- and industry-fixed effects, we also include the focal firm’s own lagged 
SUEs (up to four quarters). All independent variables are distributed to deciles ranging from zero 
to one. The results demonstrate that returns of OLFs predict focal firms’ future unexpected 
earnings, confirming that the lagged returns of OLFs anticipate the directional changes of focal 
firm fundamentals and, therefore, can drive earnings announcement returns. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we report the results of testing the unexpected earnings 
predictability over longer periods, i.e. up to four quarters ahead. Accordingly, dependent variable 
in these panels is !WX!,#12 of the focal firm, where V = 0, 1, 2, 3. The results show that, for all 
four possible cross-firm ownership links, all coefficients of lagged returns of OLFs are positive; 
however, from Quarter 1 to Quarter 4, their economic and statistical significance decreases, 
suggesting a decay of the forecasting power over time. These results also indicate that return 
predictability in OLFs is consistent with a gradual information diffusion of cash flows, and that it 
is unlikely to be related to changes in the underlying risk structure of firms. In Section 5, we 
provide an in-depth discussion of the results of our analysis of the main drivers of predictability 
in OLFs. 
 
4.3. Ownership link changes 
In this section, we address the endogeneity concerns that could impact our findings on 
predictability in OLFs. For instance, the reason why OLFs exhibit predictability may be due not 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559099
19 
 
to a specific ownership structure, but be caused by some omitted firm characteristics, general low 
level of information transparency in our sample firms, and so forth. To explore this possibility, we 
examine whether the ability of OLFs to forecast returns of focal firms changes in a particular 
setting—specifically, the one where we can follow the same firms before the formation of their 
ownership links and after the formation of such links. To this end, we use the 
difference-in-difference (DiD) methodology and a four-year time window embracing two years 
before and two years after the ownership link event. 
The advantage of this setting is that it makes it possible to evaluate time lags in 
information updating of the same firms, when they transition from ownership-de-linked to 
ownership-linked. Our expectation is that, if a focal firm has no ownership links with companies 
that later become ownership-linked to it, then the lagged portfolio returns on these companies 
would have a weak or no predictability for the focal firm’s future returns. The OLF return 
predictability arises only when the same companies become interlinked through ownership. 
We identify all cases where a firm without any ownership links transforms into a firm with 
at least one ownership link. These firms form our sample of real-focal firms or the treatment 
group for each ownership link. Consequently, we define Y231-R3*- as a dummy variable, 
which is set to one if a focal firm has undergone through such transition, and zero otherwise. In 
addition, we define :5D-6$*V as a dummy variable, which equals one after the establishment of 
ownership links, and zero otherwise. We include observations within two years prior to the 
change in firm ownership links and those within two years after the change. 
For the real-focal firm in the treatment group, we select pseudo-focal firms in the control 
group prior to the change in ownership links. This procedure consists of the following four steps. 
First, we choose pseudo-focal firms in the same industry (two-digit NAICS code) as the 
real-focal firm within two years prior to the change in ownership links. Second, we select ten 
pseudo-focal firms that are most similar to a given real-focal firm within two years prior to the 
change in ownership links. We determine this similarity based on the average ranking of the 
following four firm characteristics: size, book-to-market ratio, asset growth, and gross 
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profitability. Third, we run the Fama-MacBeth regressions and compare the OLF predictive 
coefficients of the control group with those of the “treatment” group within two years prior to the 
status change. We use the same OLFs to predict returns of both pseudo-focal and real-focal firms. 
Finally, for each real-focal firm, we select firms with the most similar OLF predictive coefficients 
as those of matched pseudo-focal firms. 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the differences between real- and pseudo-focal firms for each of 
their four firm characteristics, along with the corresponding estimate of the OLF predictive 
coefficient prior to the event date. We report these differences for all four types of OLFs with 
their respective t-statistics. We additionally record the number of real and pseudo-focal firms for 
each ownership link. The results suggest that all differences in characteristics between the 
“treatment” and “control” groups are small and insignificant. Therefore, we can confidently 
conclude that the two groups are similar to each other before ownership link changes in focal 
firms.  
Panel B of Table 6 depicts the results of the DiD test on the OLF return predictability 
before and after the changes in firm ownership links. The dependent variable is the monthly 
excess return of real- and pseudo-focal firms. The regressor of interest here is the triple 
interaction term between the OLF predictor (!"#!,#$%, :12!,#$%, !$D_!"#!,#$%, or !$D_:12!,#$%) 
and Y231-R3*- and :5D-6$*V dummy variables. All four predictors are subsumed under one 
generic name, (HI!,#$% . The controls include the corresponding OLF predictor, the 
aforementioned two dummy variables, and other variables from Table 4. Consistently with our 
expectations, the test results for all four types of firm ownership indicate that, when a firm 
establishes ownership links, its corresponding OLF predictor becomes significant at the 1% level. 
We observe the largest economic magnitude for the subsidiary−parent predictability. In contrast, 
we find no predictability evidence among treatment firms prior to the formation of ownership 
links. In its turn, the return predictability is completely absent in the control group—both before 
and after the event date.  
Figure 2 visualizes the results of Table 6 and depicts OLF predictive coefficients of 
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real-focal firms and pseudo-focal firms before and after the formation of ownership links. The 
figure has four plots for each of the four types of ownership links. The event window embraces 
24 months before and after the event month. We depict the monthly estimates of predictor 
coefficients for treatment and controls groups, as well as their mean values over the 24-month 
period before and after the event. The plots show that, before the event date, the coefficients on 
all four OLF predictors for both treatment and control groups of firms are effectively zero. 
However, after the formation of ownership links, the treatment firms experience a positive shift in 
OLF predictability, suggesting that linked firms have predictive power only after they become 
factually connected through ownership.  
 
5. Explaining Return Predictability in OLFs 
This section reports the results of our analysis of five non-mutually exclusive mechanisms that 
could potentially explain the documented return predictability in firms with ownership links. 
These five mechanisms are (1) investors’ inattention; (2) limits to arbitrage; (3) decision 
commonality; (4) ownership complexity; and (5) active internal capital markets. Our aim is to 
identify which of these five mechanisms are the most dominant. To this end, we run our statistical 
tests for each explanatory mechanism and horse-race them to determine their relative importance. 
First, assuming that investors’ limited attention plays an important role for return 
predictability in OLFs, we expect it to be stronger when investors have a lower attention. To test 
this prediction, we use the following four variables to capture investors’ inattention to focal firms 
commonly used in the literature: analyst coverage, institutional holdings, search index, and 
advertising cost (e.g., Huang, 2015; Lee et al., 2019; Ali and Hirshleifer, 2020). Analyst coverage 
is computed by orthogonalizing the analyst coverage of the focal firm with respect to its market 
capitalization. Institutional holding is evaluated by orthogonalizing the institutional ownership of 
the focal firm with respect to its market capitalization. Following Da et al. (2011), we define 
search index as the retail investor attention through the Google search volume index. Advertising 
cost is the firm advertising and promotional expenses from Refinitiv Eikon. All these measures 
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are taken as reciprocals.16 
Second, in a frictionless market, predictable stock returns are arbitraged away. However, 
due to high limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), some mispricing may not completely 
be ruled out. In this respect, Mitchell et al. (2002) found strong impediments to arbitrage even 
when a firm’s market value is less than the sum of its publicly traded parts. Therefore, when 
stocks have high arbitrage implementation costs, we expect a stronger return predictability effect, 
since sophisticated institutional investors may find it unprofitable to trade in mispriced securities. 
To measure the limits to arbitrage in equity markets, we use the following four commonly used 
variables: equity volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, and the reciprocal of the trading 
volume (Ang et al., 2006; 2009; Augustin et al., 2020). Equity volatility is the quarterly volatility 
of firm’s stock returns. We compute idiosyncratic volatility as the residuals’ standard deviation 
based on the regression of daily stock returns on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
in the previous month (requiring at least 10 daily returns). Our measure of illiquidity is the 
Amihud (2002) measure based on the price impact, while the trading volume is the log of the 
dollar value of traded shares. 
Third, return predictability in OLFs may be driven by decision commonality in ownership 
connected companies. For instance, Burt et al. (2020) reported that board members common to 
two OLFs could implement corporate decisions within one firm and then apply the same policies 
to another firm, which could lead to an asynchronous market response to these OLFs and, 
therefore, induce return predictability. Furthermore, Gao et al. (2017) found that common 
institutional holdings can induce return predictability even in economically non-connected firms. 
Therefore, if the same institutional investors hold two OLFs, these investors’ large portfolio 
reallocations could again impact decision making in those ownership-linked firms, even with no 
common board members. In addition, Ali and Hirshleifer (2020) established that 
firms—particularly, those with complex and indirect linkages covered by the same financial 
 
16 We do not consider firm size as another proxy for investors’ inattention, since it can also be easily related to other 
mechanisms, e.g. limits to arbitrage. 
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analysts—show strong cross-firm predictability. Consequently, the management of two 
ownership connected firms, which are monitored and ranked by the same analysts, could again 
consider similar corporate policy decisions. Therefore, we use the following three decision 
commonality proxies: corporate board overlap, common institutional holdings, and the number of 
shared analysts. The board membership data are from BoardEx. 
Fourth, Chan et al. (1996) found that price continuation results from a gradual response to 
information. In addition, Daniel et al. (1998; 2001) and Hirshleifer (2001) reported that investors’ 
behavioral biases increase in situations of more information uncertainty. Furthermore, Barinov et 
al. (2016) linked firm complexity to larger post-earnings announcement drifts, while Cohen and 
Lou (2012) demonstrated the existence of stock return predictability from easy-to-analyze firms 
to more complicated ones. Similarly, the more complex is the process of information gathering 
from OLFs, the longer is the response to information, and the stronger should be return 
predictability in OLFs. Accordingly, in this study, we consider the following three proxies of 
ownership complexity: the number of OLFs for a given focal firm, the number of foreign OLFs 
for a given focal firm, and the number of different industry OLFs for a given focal firm.  
Finally, the fifth possible mechanism of the OLF return predictability is the existence of 
internal capital markets. Since cash flows from a parent firm or one of its subsidiaries can be used 
to fund investment needs in other ownership-linked subsidiaries or parent firms, the speed of 
investors’ response to information of OLFs may depend on the existence of ICM. However, these 
investments may not necessarily be value-enhancing for the firm. For instance, several previous 
studies show that a parent firm may subsidize one loss-making subsidiary by transferring funds 
from more profitable subsidiaries (e.g., Stulz, 1990; Meyer et al., 1992; Lamont, 1997; Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Inderst and Mueller, 2003). In addition, Berger and Ofek (1995) established that 
ICM activities, such as overinvestment and cross-subsidization, can decrease information 
processing efficiency in a group and lead to firm value discounts. Furthermore, Lamont and Polk 
(2001) found that firms with larger value discounts have higher subsequent returns. Accordingly, 
even if the parent firm’s investors are conscious of all ownership links of that firm, these 
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investors may still be skeptical about whether, for instance, a positive cash flow announcement 
for one subsidiary would constitute a positive piece of information for the parent firm. 
Accordingly, we predict that the more active is the ICM of the parent firm (or subsidiary), the 
more severe would be the lag in incorporating information into the subsidiary’s (or parent firm’s) 
price and, therefore, the stronger would return predictability in OLFs. 
To determine whether the ICM is active, we use the Shin and Stulz (1998) methodology. 
We consider only stocks with complete ownership links over the 36-month period. First, we 
examine subsidiary−parent and parent−parent return predictabilities. In this case, a parent firm 
has different subsidiaries.17 For the smallest subsidiary $ of parent firm ,, we run the following 













															+	[/,&\!,&,#$% + ]&,#,                   (6) 
where U!,&,# is the gross investment of the smallest subsidiary $ of focal parent firm ,; YS&,#$% 
is the book value of the total assets of focal parent firm ,; C34#	!,&,# is the sum of the cash flow of 
all subsidiaries of focal parent firm ,, except that of the smallest subsidiary $; !!,&,#$% is the 
sales of the smallest subsidiary $ of focal parent firm ,; C!,&,# is the cash flow of the smallest 
subsidiary $ of focal parent firm ,; \!,&,#$% is Tobin’s q for the smallest subsidiary $ of focal 
parent firm ,.18  
Second, we examine parent−subsidiary and subsidiary−subsidiary return predictabilities. 
 
17 Our tests with the parent firm’s largest subsidiary yield similar results. The results are available upon request. 
18 The applicability of ICM calculated from Eq. (10) to both subsidiary−parent and parent−parent ownership links is 
based on the convention in return predictability studies for inter-firm links. For instance, with this convention, when 
checking whether firm size affects the predictability of Y from X, only Y is sorted on size, instead of using some 
weighted-average of sizes of Y and X. In reality, the size of X should also affect the predictability of Y from X; 
however, the correct relative weights over Y and X are difficult to estimate. Given that the weight on Y should 
dominate the weight on X, we can have a LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) type of 
truncation to set the weight on X to zero. In our scenario, a focal parent firm can have multiple sister parent firms 
through multiple commonly owned subsidiaries. For ICMs, we have to estimate the weight of each sister parent firm 
and the weight of the focal parent firm and then take their weighted-average. However, since the weight on ICMs of 
the focal parent firm should dominate the weights on ICMs of sister parent firms, we set the weights of ICMs of all 
sister parent firms to zero. Therefore, based on the existing convention, both parent−parent and subsidiary−parent 
cases computationally have the same ICMs. The same rationale applies to our Eq. (11) for both parent−subsidiary 
and subsidiary−subsidiary cases. 
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In this case, one subsidiary may have different parent firms. Therefore, we run the following 













															+	[/,!\!,#$% + ]!,#,                                                    (7) 
where U!,# is the gross investment of focal subsidiary $, YS!,#$% is the book value of the total 
assets of focal subsidiary $; C34#	!,# is the sum of the cash flow of focal subsidiary $’s all parent 
firms’ all subsidiaries, except for focal subsidiary $; !!,#$% is the sales of focal subsidiary $; C!,# 
is the cash flow of focal subsidiary $; and \!,#$% is Tobin’s q for focal subsidiary $. To correct 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the standard errors in the above two regressions are 
Newey-West adjusted. Following Shin and Stulz (1998), we consider ICM “active” if [% in Eq. 
(6) and (7) is significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels.  
Table 7 shows the results of our tests on five independent mechanisms of return 
predictability in OLFs using individual firm characteristics. For each firm characteristic, we split 
the sample at the median into “High” and “Low” subsamples. In the next step, for each of the 
four ownership links and each firm characteristic, we run the corresponding specification in Panel 
A of Table 4 by interacting the appropriate (HI!,#$% with a dummy variable “High,” which is 
equal to unity if the value of the firm characteristic is above the median, and zero otherwise. The 
estimated coefficient on (HI!,#$% × 4$_ℎ  reflects the difference in the strength of return 
predictability in OLFs between “High” or “Low” values of the specific firm characteristic. All 
regressions also include the dummy variable itself, and, as in Table 4, the lagged control variables 
and country- and industry-fixed effects. In line with our expectation, we find evidence on the 
relevance of all mechanisms to the OLF return predictability. However, the strongest economic 
and statistical results are recorded for ICM, when the significance level of coefficient [% in Eq. 
(6) and (7) is 5% or 1%. The impact of ownership complexity also turns out to be strong, as its all 
four individual proxies are significant at the 5% or 1% levels across all four ownership links. The 
weakest outcome is obtained for the three decision commonality measures—for most part, they 
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lead to only 10% significance in the difference between the “High” and “Low” subsamples in the 
impact of respective firm characteristics on return predictability. The results of our tests on 
individual variables proxying investors’ inattention and limits to arbitrage demonstrate that the 
importance of these two mechanisms is likely to be between that of ownership complexity and 
decision commonality. We also observe that the extent of predictability differs between “High” 
and Low” subsamples similarly for each firm characteristic across the four types of OLFs, with 
the largest being observed for the vertical subsidiary−parent pair and the lowest—for the 
horizontal parent−parent one. This outcome is consistent with the same ranking of OLF return 
predictability across the four ownership connections in Table 4. 
Our next goal is to re-estimate the tests in Table 7 using aggregate measures for our 
mechanisms of return predictability in OLFs and evaluate their relative importance in joint tests, 
since these mechanisms are not independent from each other. To this end, we first obtain the 
composite measures of each of the first four explanatory mechanisms: the composite investors’ 
inattention (CII) metric, the composite limits to arbitrage (CLA) metric, the composite ownership 
complexity (COC) metric, and the composite decision commonality (CDC) metric. Each of these 
four metrics is constructed by averaging the rankings of constituent firm characteristics for each 
mechanism. We then define four dummy variables—namely, 4$_ℎ_CUU, 4$_ℎ_CHS, 4$_ℎ_C(C, 
and 4$_ℎ_C`C—to be equal to unity if CII, CLA, COC, and CDC, respectively, are above the 
median, and zero otherwise. We define a dummy variable 4$_ℎ_UCQ to be equal to unity if the 
ICM is active at the 5% level, and zero otherwise.  
Table 8 reports our test results for five independent mechanisms of return predictability in 
OLFs using composite firm characteristics and their joint test. It includes four panels (Panel A-D) 
for each of the four types of ownership-linked return predictability. Each panel has six columns. 
Columns 1-5 in each panel reflect the individual testing outcomes of the five possible explanatory 
mechanisms for predictability in OLFs using our composite metrics. We report only the 
coefficients on interactive terms between each OLF predictor, (HI!,#$%  (!"#!,#$% , :12!,#$% , 
!$D_!"#!,#$%, or !$D_:12!,#$%), and our five dummy variables indicating above the median values 
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of our four explanatory mechanisms metrics, i.e. 4$_ℎ_CUU , 4$_ℎ_CHS , 4$_ℎ_C(C , 
4$_ℎ_C`C, and 4$_ℎ_UCQ, as well as the coefficients on the corresponding non-interactive 
OLF predictors themselves. The results show that the slopes on all interactive (HI!,#$% terms 
across all panels are significant at least at the 5% level. Moreover, the slopes on the interactive 
(HI!,#$% terms are significant at the 1% level across several columns and panels. This again 
indicates that all five mechanisms can underlie the empirical findings on return predictability in 
OLFs with a complex ownership network. 
Next, to understand the relative importance of each of the above five mechanisms that 
may be responsible for return predictability in OLFs, we horse race all five possible mechanisms 
against each other in a joint estimation again using the Fama-MacBeth setting (see Columns 6 of 
Panels A-D, Table 8). Indeed, since the correlation among composite proxies for all five 
mechanisms is positive, significant results for one explanation of predictability may simply 
reflect the importance of the other ones. For instance, when the activity of ICM is high within a 
given ownership connected firm, fewer analysts may be willing to cover it, and fewer 
institutional investors may want to hold stakes in such firm. This could lead to higher investors’ 
inattention and more limits to arbitrage. The results show that all coefficients on the interactive 
term (HI!,#$% 	× 4$_ℎ_UCQ are positive and retain their 1% significance in a joint estimation. 
The point estimates corresponding to the other mechanisms either become substantially weaker 
or completely lose their statistical significance. However, our predictability results may partially 
be related to ownership complexity: the point estimates on (HI!,#$% 	× 4$_ℎ_C(C  are 
significant at the 10% level in Column 6 for all types of OLFs, except for the weakest 
parent−parent one. Overall, our tests show that ICMs provide the best explanation of the 
documented return predictability in OLFs. 
Many previous studies explained the activity of ICMs by poor corporate governance and 
opaque country-level investment culture (Scharfstein and Stein, 2002; Desai et al., 2004; Ozbas 
and Scharfstein, 2010; Sautner and Villalonga, 2010; Gugler et al., 2013). Therefore, we can 
further substantiate the predominant role of ICMs in explaining return predictability in OLFs by 
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showing their importance particularly for OLFs located in countries with a weaker rule of law 
(ROL). To this end, we proxy ROL in each of the 23 developed countries by the anti-self-dealing 
index (Djankov et al., 2008), which is a number between zero and unity. 
Table 9 shows the results of our tests on the impact of ROL on the extent to which active 
ICMs explain return predictability in OLFs. As in Table 8, we use Fama-MacBeth regressions and 
control for other four mechanisms for return predictability in OLFs. We define a dummy variable 
H5)_+(H to be equal to unity if OLFs are from countries with the anti-self-dealing index below 
0.5, and zero otherwise. All four specific ownership predictors are subsumed under one generic 
name, (HI!,#$%. The variable of interest here is (HI!,#$% × High_ ICM × Low_ROL. We do 
not report the other terms resulting from this triple interaction term. The table shows that the 
coefficient of interest is positive and significant at the 10% level for all four types of return 
predictability in OLFs. However, the coefficient on (HI!,#$% × High_ICM remains significant 
at the 5% level in all estimations. In these tests, we lose the marginal significance of the 
composite ownership complexity measure. 
Overall, our test results show that two out of three specific mechanisms newly proposed in 
our study—namely, ownership complexity and particularly active internal capital markets—tend to 
be more powerful than the two generic mechanisms commonly used in the literature—namely, 
investors’ inattention and limits to arbitrage. Specifically, the existence of active internal capital 
markets among firms with ownership links appears to be the most important explanation of return 
predictability in OLFs. This finding distinguishes the source of predictability in firms with 
ownership links from that of other cross-firm return anomalies, which are usually explained by low 
investor attention or high arbitrage costs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we used the data from 23 developed markets to explore return predictability in firms 
with multi-layer ownership structure. Our results demonstrate that the lagged one month returns 
of ownership-linked firms can predict the next month return of the focal firm. We find that four 
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trading strategies—namely, subsidiary−parent, parent−subsidiary, subsidiary−subsidiary, and 
parent−parent—generate abnormal returns that are not subsumed by risk factors and firm 
characteristics. The largest return predictability is generated for the subsidiary−parent ownership 
link, while the lowest—for the parent-parent one. 
To interpret our findings on ownership-link implied return predictability, we consider five 
possible mechanisms: two generic ones commonly used in the literature (namely, investors’ 
inattention and limits to arbitrage), one new yet applicable to many return predictability studies 
(namely, commonality in decision making), and two novel and specific to our study (namely, 
ownership complexity, as a particular type of firm information complexity, and active internal 
capital markets). The results of our tests reveal the dominant role of active internal capital 
markets, and, to a certain extent, ownership complexity as the underlying drivers of return 
predictability among ownership-linked firms. 
Overall, using global cross-ownership data, we are able to demonstrate that a complex 
ownership network may lead to complicated information processing and hence return 
predictability across OLFs. On the one hand, we provide this evidence indirectly, by showing that 
the observed predictability cannot be explained by industry- or cross-country momentums, as 
well as by other known inter-firm effects, including customer−supplier links, strategic alliance 
partners, common institutional investors, common board members, and shared analyst coverage. 
On the other hand, we also provide direct evidence, by showing that the novel predictability 
phenomenon can be explained by the mechanisms that are unique to firms with a complex 
ownership, such as internal capital market activities. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable Description Source Frequency 
"#$!,#$% 
Parent firm %’s ownership-weighted portfolio returns of 
subsidiaries in month & − 1 




Subsidiary %’s control-weighted portfolio returns of 
parent firms in month & − 1 




Subsidiary %’s value-weighted portfolio returns of its 
sister subsidiaries in month & − 1 




Parent firm %’s value-weighted portfolio returns of its 
sister parent firms in month & − 1 
CRSP, Eikon, FactSet, 
Orbis 
Monthly 
.!,# Focal firm %’s return in month & 




Focal firm %’s excess return in month & over a 
one-month US T-bill rate 
K. French Data  Monthly 
Ln(Size) Log market capitalization CRSP, Compustat, 
Eikon  
Monthly 
Ln(B/M) Log book value at the end of December over the market 




012 Focal firm’s cumulative return over t-12 to t-2 months CRSP, Eikon Monthly 
Turnover # of daily shares traded over # of shares outstanding at 
the day end, averaged over the past 12 months 
CRSP, Eikon Monthly 
Ind_Mom The value-weighted industry return of the focal firm CRSP, Eikon  
K. French Data 
Monthly 
AG Asset growth – an annual growth rate of total assets CRSP, Compustat, 
Eikon 
Monthly 
GP Gross profitability – the revenue minus cost of goods 





The residual percentage of shares held by institutions, 
orthogonalized by firm’s market capitalization  
CRSP, Eikon, FactSet Monthly 





Standard deviation of the Fama and French (1993) 
regression residuals of daily stock returns past month  
CRSP, Compustat, 
Eikon, K. French Data 
Monthly 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for all publicly listed parent and subsidiary firms from 23 developed markets 
between January 2006 and December 2018. All financial firms (two-digit NAICS code = 52) and stocks priced less 
than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. Panel A reports the full sample summary statistics of parent and 
subsidiary firms and for four types of ownership-linked firms (OLFs), subsidiary-parent (Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary 
(Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). Panel B presents country-level statistics. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the yearly average number of parent firms and subsidiaries in each country, respectively. 
Column 3 and 4 show the average number of subsidiary-parent and parent-subsidiary links in each country, 
respectively. Column 5 and 6 show the average number of links between sister subsidiaries and between sister parent 
firms in each country, respectively. Panel C shows the summary statistics of firm characteristics. Firm characteristics 
include market capitalization (Size), book-to-market ratio (B/M), asset growth (AG), gross profitability (GP), and 
Momentum (Mom). All variables are defined in the Appendix and winsorized within each cross-section at 1% and 99% 
levels. 
 
Panel A: Full sample description 
 Mean SD Min Med Max 
Number of parent firms 1,287 108 1,021 1,193 1,575 
Number of subsidiaries 2,208 201 1,630 2,087 2,818 
Number of subsidiaries per parent firm (Sub-Par) 2.58 1.97 1 2 9 
Number of parent firms per subsidiary (Par-Sub) 1.42 1.11 1 1 4 
Number of sister subsidiaries per subsidiary (Sub-Sub) 2.40 1.81 1 2 6 
Number of sister parent firms per parent firm (Par-Par) 1.30 0.97 1 1 4 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Country-level statistics 
 Yearly average number of  Average number of  Average number of sister 
 Parent firms Subsidiaries  Sub-Par Par-Sub  Subsidiaries Parent firms 
Australia 58 95  1.33 1.00  1.00 N/A 
Austria 5 8  2.20 1.25  2.00 1.50 
Belgium 16 23  2.13 1.17  2.00 1.08 
Canada 43 72  2.51 1.39  2.33 1.27 
Denmark 5 8  2.20 1.25  2.13 1.50 
Finland 4 5  2.00 1.20  2.00 1.00 
France 132 217  2.47 1.36  2.30 1.24 
Germany 83 144  2.61 1.44  2.43 1.32 
Greece 7 9  1.86 1.00  1.00 N/A 
Hong Kong (China) 96 169  2.65 1.46  2.47 1.34 
Ireland 3 3  1.33 1.00  1.00 N/A 
Italy 10 14  2.20 1.21  2.00 1.50 
Japan 476 949  3.50 1.93  3.26 1.76 
Netherlands 18 28  2.33 1.29  2.20 1.19 
New Zealand 3 3  1.33 1.00  1.00 N/A 
Norway 29 46  2.41 1.33  2.25 1.22 
Portugal 7 10  2.14 1.20  2.00 1.50 
Singapore 82 105  1.91 1.06  1.79 N/A 
Spain 16 25  2.31 1.28  2.18 1.18 
Sweden 40 76  2.85 1.57  2.66 1.44 
Switzerland 38 54  2.13 1.19  1.99 1.08 
UK 26 36  1.31 1.00  1.00 N/A 
USA 90 109  1.26 1.00  1.00 N/A 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Parent firm Mean SD Min Med Max 
Size ($ bln) 18.56 32.73 2.46 17.85 49.31 
B/M   0.75 0.93 0.16 0.56 1.62 
Asset Growth (AG) 0.15 0.38 -0.65 0.09 6.30 
Gross Profitability (GP) 0.41 0.25 -0.91 0.38 1.22 
Momentum (Mom) 0.15 0.55 -0.95 0.07 12.45 
Subsidiary Mean SD Min Med Max 
Size ($ bln) 2.95 8.45 0.59 3.07 14.50 
B/M   0.69 0.64 0.14 0.45 1.53 
Asset Growth (AG) 0.22 0.38 0.00 0.15 1.41 
Gross Profitability (GP) 0.46 0.37 -0.45 0.43 1.29 
Momentum (Mom) 0.23 0.65 -0.98 0.12 15.26 
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Table 2: Univariate portfolio sorts  
 
This table shows the abnormal returns of value-weighted (VW) and equally-weighted (EW) univariate portfolio sorts 
of focal firms for four types of return predictabilities in ownership-linked firms (OLFs): parent-subsidiary, 
subsidiary-parent, subsidiary-subsidiary, and parent-parent. The sample includes firms from 23 developed markets 
from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation 
date are excluded. The results are shown for four types of OLFs: subsidiary-parent (Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary 
(Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). Panel A reports the excess returns for all 
quintile portfolios (with Q1 being the lowest, and Q5 being the highest) as well as the returns for the Q5-Q1 
difference portfolio. Panel B reports abnormal returns for the lowest and highest quintile portfolios as well as the 
Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Panel C reports abnormal returns 
for the lowest and highest quintile portfolios as well as the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French 
(2018) six-factor model. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) are computed based on the developed market 
factors from the K. French data library. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West 
adjusted with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excess returns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.19 0.03 0.11 0.08 
Q2 0.19 0.51* 0.51* 0.42* 
Q3 0.60** 0.29 0.40* 0.85** 
Q4 0.38 0.75** 0.68** 0.59* 
Q5 (High) 0.99** 1.01** 0.96** 1.12** 
Q5 – Q1 1.18*** 0.97*** 0.85*** 1.03*** 
  (4.23) (3.41) (3.22) (3.84) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.35 -0.22 -0.12 0.00 
Q2 0.03 0.49* 0.46* 0.33 
Q3 0.71** 0.14 0.22 0.77** 
Q4 0.38 0.68** 0.71** 0.54* 
Q5 (High) 1.08** 1.14** 1.08** 1.14** 
Q5 – Q1 1.43*** 1.37*** 1.20*** 1.15*** 
  (5.09) (4.83) (4.56) (4.26) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.83** -0.49* -0.45* -0.52** 
Q5 (High) 0.30* 0.33* 0.28 0.36* 
Q5 – Q1 1.13*** 0.82*** 0.73*** 0.88*** 
  (3.68) (2.84) (2.73) (3.05) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.89** -0.70** -0.63** -0.61** 
Q5 (High) 0.33* 0.45* 0.40* 0.43* 
Q5 – Q1 1.22*** 1.15*** 1.03*** 1.05*** 
  (3.97) (3.99) (3.85) (3.63) 
 
Panel C: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.81** -0.48* -0.45* -0.46* 
Q5 (High) 0.32* 0.29 0.30* 0.33* 
Q5 – Q1 1.13*** 0.77** 0.76*** 0.79*** 
  (3.66) (2.54) (2.79) (2.78) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.91** -0.64** -0.66** -0.54** 
Q5 (High) 0.35* 0.37* 0.44* 0.39* 
Q5 – Q1 1.26*** 1.01*** 1.10*** 0.93*** 
  (4.09) (3.40) (4.01) (3.25) 
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Table 3: Long-term portfolio alphas 
 
This table shows the long-term portfolio alphas of value-weighted univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms for four 
types of return predictabilities in ownership-linked firms (OLFs): parent-subsidiary, subsidiary-parent, 
subsidiary-subsidiary, and parent-parent. The sample includes firms from 23 developed markets from January 2006 
to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. 
The results are shown for four types of OLFs: subsidiary-parent (Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary (Par-Sub), 
subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). The table reports monthly five-factor alphas and 
six-factor alphas for Q5-Q1 difference portfolio from two to six months ahead after portfolio formation. Panel A 
reports the abnormal returns for the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. 
Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2018) six-factor 
model. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) are computed based on the developed market factors from the K. 
French data library. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Fama and French (2015) five-factor Q5-Q1 difference portfolio alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
t + 2 0.98*** 0.69** 0.61** 0.72** 
 (3.05) (2.49) (2.24) (2.51) 
t + 3 0.84** 0.60** 0.49* 0.61** 
 (2.54) (2.00) (1.93) (2.06) 
t + 4 0.69** 0.52* 0.42* 0.50* 
 (2.23) (1.78) (1.65) (1.82) 
t + 5 0.56* 0.45 0.36 0.41 
 (1.83) (1.48) (1.40) (1.48) 
t + 6 0.46 0.36 0.32 0.37 
 (1.50) (1.33) (1.20) (1.27) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2018) six-factor Q5-Q1 difference portfolio alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
t + 2 0.97*** 0.66** 0.61** 0.68** 
 (2.97) (2.10) (2.43) (2.46) 
t + 3 0.79** 0.58* 0.50** 0.59** 
 (2.45) (1.87) (2.03) (2.16) 
t + 4 0.68** 0.48* 0.43* 0.52* 
 (2.19) (1.65) (1.79) (1.83) 
t + 5 0.59* 0.42 0.38 0.42 
 (1.87) (1.35) (1.54) (1.49) 
t + 6 0.51 0.37 0.33 0.35 
 (1.56) (1.11) (1.38) (1.26) 
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Table 4: Multivariate regressions of OLF return predictability  
 
This table shows the estimation results from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for four trading 
strategies of ownership-linked firms (OLFs). The sample includes firms from 23 developed markets from January 
2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are 
excluded. The dependent variable in Panel A is the excess return of the focal firm, +/&!,#, in Panels B – the 
risk-adjusted return from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, 3_445, and in Panel C – from the Fama 
and French (2018) six-factor model, 3_446. The risk-adjusted returns are computed based on the developed market 
factors from the K. French data library. The explanatory variables include the lagged one-month portfolio returns of 
OLFs ("#$!,#$%, )*+!,#$%, "%,_"#$!,#$%, or "%,_)*+!,#$%), firm size, 78("%:/), book-to-market ratio, 78(</0), 
focal firm’s own lagged monthly return, .!,#$%, medium-term price momentum, 012, asset growth, >?, gross 
profitability, ?), stock turnover, @#+81A/+, and industry momentum, B8C_012. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix, are based on the last non-missing observation for each month & and winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. 
All regressions include country and industry (measured at two-digit NAICS codes) fixed effects, but their estimates 
are not shown. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six 
lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excess returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: +/&!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 4.78***    
 (3.05)    
)*+!,#$%  3.09***   
  (3.87)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   2.32***  
   (3.03)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    1.29*** 
    (3.58) 
Ln(Size) -0.21* -0.24*** -0.30*** -0.16** 
 (1.71) (3.35) (4.71) (2.10) 
Ln(B/M) 0.40** 0.22** 0.13 0.22*** 
 (2.12) (2.02) (0.29) (2.65) 
.!,#$% -4.92*** -1.49 -3.27*** -1.28** 
 (3.27) (1.25) (3.41) (1.99) 
Mom -0.60 1.63* -0.34 1.48* 
 (0.58) (1.94) (0.72) (1.78) 
AG -0.66** -0.05 -0.24 -0.94*** 
 (2.45) (0.10) (1.32) (3.42) 
GP 0.04 0.47*** 0.19 0.07 
 (0.97) (2.91) (1.17) (1.27) 
Turnover -0.10** -0.22 -0.17** -0.76*** 
 (2.09) (0.75) (2.06) (2.94) 
Ind_Mom 0.83* 1.27** 1.29** 0.79* 
 (1.76) (2.14) (2.48) (1.70) 
Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 200,772 344,448 212,869 76,695 
R2 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: 3_445!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 3.53**    
 (2.27)    
)*+!,#$%  2.05***   
  (2.68)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   1.52**  
   (2.08)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    0.98** 
    (2.45) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 200,772 344,448 212,869 76,695 
R2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 
 
Panel C: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: 3_446!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 3.02**    
 (1.98)    
)*+!,#$%  2.22***   
  (2.88)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   1.44*  
   (1.90)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    1.03*** 
    (2.86) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 200,772 344,448 212,869 76,695 
R2 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06 
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Table 5: Forecasting earnings surprises  
 
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of the predictability of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) for 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUEs). The SUEs are calculated as the yearly change in quarterly earnings scaled 
by the standard deviation of unexpected earnings over the eight past quarters. The explanatory variables include the 
preceding three months portfolio returns of OLFs, D74!,#$% (i.e., "#$!,#$%, )*+!,#$%, "%,_"#$!,#$%, or "%,_)*+!,#$%). 
The results are reported for four types of OLF predictability: subsidiary-parent (Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary 
(Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). All the independent variables are distributed 
to deciles and scaled from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is winsorized at 1% and 99% levels in the cross-section. 
The control variables are from Table 4 as well as one- to four-quarter lags of the firm’s own SUEs. All regressions 
include country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are not shown. Panel A reports regression results for 
the next quarter’s SUEs. Panel B reports regression results of future SUEs for the next four fiscal quarters. The 
t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with four lags. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: One-quarter ahead forecast  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: "EF!,# *100 Sub-Par Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
D74!,#$% 0.60*** 0.67*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 
 (2.75) (5.05) (2.61) (2.98) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 35,650 61,162 37,798 13,618 
R2 0.46 0.54 0.39 0.43 
 
Panel B: Extended forecast 
DV: "EF!,#&' k = 0, 1, 2, 3 Quarter 1  Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Subsidiary – Parent predictability     
"#$!,#$% 0.60*** 0.50** 0.33** 0.22 
 (2.75) (2.42) (2.23) (1.57) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Parent – Subsidiary predictability     
)*+!,#$% 0.67*** 0.45*** 0.25** 0.14 
 (5.05) (3.73) (2.32) (1.21) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Subsidiary – Subsidiary predictability     
"%,_"#$!,#$% 0.36*** 0.25* 0.16 0.04 
 (2.61) (1.83) (1.52) (0.45) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Parent – Parent predictability     
"%,_)*+!,#$% 0.46*** 0.28* 0.21 0.08 
 (2.98) (1.70) (1.60) (0.77) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6: Impact of ownership link changes on the OLF return predictability 
 
This table uses the difference-in-difference (DiD) method to test the return predictability before and after the 
establishment of ownership links within the same group of firms. The sample includes firms from 23 developed 
markets from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio 
formation date are excluded. We identify all cases in which a firm without any ownership links transforms into a firm 
with at least one ownership link. We include observations within two years before and within two years after the 
transition of ownership links. @+/*&2/8& is a dummy variable, which equals one if a focal firm has undergone 
through such transition and zero otherwise. )1,&G%8H is a dummy variable, which equals one in any month after the 
formation of ownership links and zero otherwise. For the real-focal firm in the treatment group, we select 
pseudo-focal firms in the control group prior to the change in ownership links. It is a four-step procedure. First, we 
choose pseudo-focal firms which are in the same industry (two-digit NAICS code) as the real-focal firm in two years 
prior to the change in ownership links. Second, we select ten most similar pseudo-focal firms to a given real-focal 
firm in two years prior to the change in ownership links based on the average ranking of four firm characteristics: 
size, book-to-market ratio, asset growth, and gross profitability. Third, we run the Fama-MacBeth regressions and 
compare the OLF predictive coefficients for the control group of firms with those of the “treatment” group within 
two years prior to the status change. We use the same OLF to predict returns of both pseudo-focal and real-focal 
firms. Finally, we select most similar OLF predictive coefficient firms as matched pseudo-focal firms for each 
real-focal firm. This procedure gives us a total of 546 firms in the control sample. Panel A shows the ex-ante 
differences between the treatment and control groups of firms. Panel B shows DiD test results on the OLF return 
predictability before and after the changes in firm ownership links. The dependent variable is the monthly excess 
return of the (real- and pseudo-) focal firm, +/&!,#. The regressor of interest is the triple interaction term between the 
lagged monthly return on one of the four OLF predictors, D74!,#$%, i.e., "#$!,#$%, )*+!,#$%, "%,_"#$!,#$%, or 
"%,_)*+!,#$%, and @+/*&2/8& and )1,&G%8H dummy variables. Control variables include the corresponding OLF 
predictor, @+/*&2/8& and )1,&G%8H dummy variables, their interaction term, Treatment × Postlink, as well as 
other controls from Table 4. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are not 
shown. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel A: Ex-ante differences between treatment and control groups of firms 
Subsidiary - Parent (102 Real – 124 Pseudo) Difference t-statistic 
Size ($ bln) 1.62 (0.23) 
BM -0.09 (0.20) 
AG -0.01 (0.48) 
GP 0.06 (0.10) 
"#$!,#$% -0.24 (0.56) 
Parent - Subsidiary (156 Real – 232 Pseudo)   
Size ($ bln) 0.24 (0.22) 
BM 0.04 (0.15) 
AG 0.02 (0.25) 
GP -0.05 (0.16) 
)*+!,#$% -0.28 (0.56) 
Subsidiary - Subsidiary (97 Real – 143 Pseudo)   
Size ($ bln) 0.43 (0.24) 
BM 0.04 (0.20) 
AG 0.03 (0.47) 
GP -0.03 (0.36) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% -0.12 (0.27) 
Parent - Parent (40 Real – 47 Pseudo)   
Size ($ bln) 1.82 (0.49) 
BM -0.08 (0.49) 
AG -0.02 (0.42) 
GP 0.02 (0.31) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% -0.11 (0.23) 
 
Panel B: The effect of changes in ownership links on return predictability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: +/&!,#*100 Sub-Par Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
D74!,#$% × Treatment × Postlink 3.72*** 2.39*** 1.36*** 1.01*** 
 (2.59) (3.55) (2.65) (3.59) 
D74!,#$% × Treatment  -0.19 -0.18 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.38) (0.75) (0.35) (0.84) 
D74!,#$% × Postlink 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.14 
 (0.88) (0.53) (0.57) (0.96) 
D74!,#$% 1.16 1.22 0.75 0.42 
 (1.28) (1.49) (1.53) (1.05) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  10,812 18,548 11,462 4,130 
R2 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 
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Table 7: Firm characteristics and mechanisms of the OLF return predictability 
 
This table shows the tests results on five independent mechanisms of the OLF return predictability using 
Fama-MacBeth regressions and individual firm characteristics. The five competing mechanisms are (1) investors’ 
inattention, (2) limits to arbitrage, (3) ownership complexity, (4) decision commonality, and (5) active internal capital 
markets (ICM). Investors’ inattention consists of four metrics: analyst coverage, institutional holdings, search index, 
and advertising cost. Analyst coverage is the residual analyst coverage computed by orthogonalizing the analyst 
coverage of the focal firm with respect to its market capitalization. Institutional holding is the residual institutional 
ownership computed by orthogonalizing the institutional ownership of the focal firm with respect to its market 
capitalization. Search index is the retail investor attention through the Google search volume index following Da et 
al. (2011). Advertising cost is the firm advertising and promotional expenses from Refinitiv Eikon. All these 
measures are taken as reciprocals (R). Limits to arbitrage consist of four metrics: equity volatility, idiosyncratic 
volatility, illiquidity, and the reciprocal of trading volume. Equity volatility is the quarterly volatility of firm’s stock 
returns. Idiosyncratic volatility is the residuals’ standard deviation based on the regression of daily stock returns on 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in the previous month (requiring at least 10 daily returns). Illiquidity 
is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure based on the price impact. Trading volume is the log of the dollar value of 
traded shares. Decision commonality consists of three metrics: corporate board overlap, common institutional 
holdings, and the number of shared analysts. Board overlap is the overlapping number of corporate board members 
between OLFs and the focal firm. The corporate board data are from BoardEx. Common institutional holding is the 
overlapping number of institutional investors between OLFs and the focal firm. Shared analysts is the overlapping 
number of analysts between OLFs and the focal firm. Ownership complexity consists of four metrics: the number of 
OLFs, the number of foreign OLFs, the number of indirectly linked OLFs, and the number of different industry 
OLFs. We follow Shin and Stulz (1998) to determine whether the ICM is active. We consider only stocks with 
complete ownership links over the 36-month period. For subsidiary-parent and parent-parent return predictabilities 












+ 	L/,(N!,(,#$% + O(,# , 
where B!,(,# is the gross investment of the smallest subsidiary %of focal parent firm Q; @>(,#$% is the book value of 
the total assets of focal parent firm Q; M*+#	!,(,# is the sum of the cash flow of all subsidiaries of focal parent firm Q 
except that of the smallest subsidiary %; "!,(,#$% is the sales of the smallest subsidiary % of focal parent firm Q; M!,(,# 
is the cash flow of the smallest subsidiary % of focal parent firm Q; N!,(,#$% is Tobin’s q for the smallest subsidiary % 
of focal parent firm Q. For parent-subsidiary and subsidiary-subsidiary return predictabilities we run the following 












+	L/,!N!,#$% + O!,# , 
where B!,# is the gross investment of focal subsidiary %, @>!,#$% is the book value of the total assets of focal 
subsidiary %, M*+#	!,# is the sum of the cash flow of focal subsidiary %’s all parent firms’ all subsidiaries except focal 
subsidiary %, "!,#$% is the sales of focal subsidiary %, M!,# is the cash flow of focal subsidiary %, and N!,#$% is 
Tobin’s q for focal subsidiary %. In both above regressions, the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We define ICM to be “active” if L% in the above two equations is significant 
at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels. Each firm characteristic is split at the median into High and Low subsamples. Then for 
each of the four ownership links and each firm characteristic, we run the corresponding specification in Panel A of 
Table 4 by interacting the appropriate D74!,#$% with “High” dummy variable. All regressions also include the 
dummy variable itself, lagged control variables from Table 4, as well as country and industry fixed effects, but their 
estimates are not shown. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six 
lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
  High-Low  
  Sub-Par Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Investors’ inattention 
Analyst Coverage (R) 2.57** 1.41*** 1.47* 0.26* 
 (1.99) (2.58) (1.79) (1.93) 
Institutional Holdings (R) 2.07** 1.66*** 1.51** 0.25** 
 (1.99) (2.67) (2.05) (1.96) 
Search Index (R) 2.55* 1.43*** 1.70** 0.32* 
 (1.93) (2.60) (2.07) (1.74) 
Advertising Cost (R) 2.49** 1.69*** 1.56* 0.27** 
 (2.02) (2.66) (1.65) (2.06) 
Limits to Arbitrage 
Equity Volatility 3.13*** 1.41** 1.57** 0.22** 
 (2.86) (1.96) (2.09) (1.96) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 3.20*** 1.26** 1.68** 0.23** 
 (2.67) (2.01) (2.12) (2.30) 
Illiquidity 3.36*** 1.41* 1.50** 0.22** 
 (2.89) (1.89) (2.28) (2.16) 
Trading Volume (R) 2.56*** 1.41* 1.71** 0.25** 
 (2.98) (1.76) (2.22) (2.18) 
Decision Commonality 
Board Overlap 2.12* 1.36* 1.50* 0.23* 
 (1.71) (1.88) (1.80) (1.93) 
Common Inst. Holdings 2.07 1.40** 1.36* 0.22* 
 (1.60) (2.03) (1.66) (1.83) 
Shared Analysts 2.06* 1.26* 1.54* 0.24** 
 (1.86) (1.92) (1.74) (2.03) 
Ownership Complexity 
# OLFs 3.25*** 1.78*** 2.07*** 0.48** 
 (2.75) (2.75) (2.68) (2.28) 
# Foreign OLFs 3.00*** 1.44*** 1.77*** 0.41** 
 (3.47) (2.69) (2.73) (2.57) 
# Indirectly Linked OLFs 3.43*** 1.81** 1.71*** 0.47** 
 (2.87) (2.46) (3.09) (2.22) 
# Different Industry OLFs 3.35*** 1.83*** 1.67** 0.44** 
 (3.41) (2.58) (2.45) (2.24) 
Internal Capital Markets 
ICM 10% significance 3.46*** 1.79*** 2.00*** 0.42*** 
 (4.38) (3.30) (4.60) (3.19) 
ICM 5% significance 4.68*** 2.25*** 2.77*** 0.57*** 
 (6.04) (4.71) (5.84) (4.53) 
ICM 1% significance 5.02*** 2.35*** 2.81*** 0.58*** 
 (6.46) (4.95) (6.25) (4.95) 
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Table 8: Joint evaluation of mechanisms of the OLF return predictability 
 
This table shows the tests results on five independent mechanisms of the OLF return predictability using 
Fama-MacBeth regressions and composite firm characteristics. The five competing mechanisms are (1) investors’ 
inattention, (2) limits to arbitrage, (3) ownership complexity, (4) decision commonality, and (5) active internal capital 
markets (ICM). Investors’ inattention consists of four metrics: the reciprocals of the number of analysts covering a 
firm, residual institutional holdings, the search index, which is the Google search volume index, as well as the 
advertising cost, which is the cost of advertising media and promotional expenses. Limits to arbitrage consist of four 
metrics: equity volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, and the reciprocal of trading volume. Decision 
commonality consists of three metrics: corporate board overlap, common institutional holdings, and the number of 
shared analysts. Ownership complexity consists of four metrics: number of OLFs, number of foreign OLFs, number 
of indirectly linked OLFs, and number of different industry OLFs. We construct composite measures of each of the 
first four mechanisms, namely, composite investors’ inattention (CII), composite limits to arbitrage (CLA), 
composite decision commonality (CDC), and composite ownership complexity (COC). We define dummy variables 
R%Sℎ_MBB, R%Sℎ_M7>,	R%Sℎ_MUM, and R%Sℎ_MDM to be equal unity if the corresponding composite measure is 
above the median and zero otherwise. The ICM measure is described in Table 7. We define ICM to be “active” if L% 
in the above two equations is significant at the 5% level and define a dummy variable R%Sℎ_BM0 to be equal unity 
if the ICM is active and zero otherwise. All regressions also include the dummy variable itself and lagged control 
variables from Table 4 as well as country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are not shown. The t-statistics 
are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Subsidiary - Parent predictability 
DV: 	+/&!,#*100 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
"#$!,#$% 4.48** 4.56** 4.62** 4.12** 4.14** 3.19* 
 (2.43) (2.50) (2.46) (1.96) (2.16) (1.82) 
"#$!,#$% × High_CII 2.63** 
    1.30 
 (2.09)     (1.21) 
"#$!,#$% × High_CLA  3.28***    1.91 
  (3.25)    (1.54) 
"#$!,#$% × High_CDC   2.22*   1.26 
   (1.81)   (1.03) 
"#$!,#$% × High_COC  
  3.88***  1.85* 
    (3.53)  (1.85) 
"#$!,#$% × High_ICM     4.68*** 3.05*** 
     (6.04) (4.14) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Parent - Subsidiary predictability 
DV: 	+/&!,#*100 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
)*+!,#$% 2.53*** 2.80*** 2.89*** 2.47*** 2.44*** 1.89** 
 (3.30) (3.33) (3.69) (3.20) (3.12) (2.06) 
)*+!,#$% × High_CII 1.64*** 
    0.94 
 (2.75)     (1.40) 
)*+!,#$% × High_CLA  1.64**    1.10 
  (2.42)    (1.53) 
)*+!,#$% × High_CDC   1.41*   0.83 
   (1.91)   (1.07) 
)*+!,#$% × High_COC  
  1.78***  1.09* 
    (2.73)  (1.79) 
)*+!,#$% × High_ICM     2.25*** 1.56*** 
     (4.71) (3.28) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Panel C: Subsidiary - Subsidiary predictability 
DV: 	+/&!,#*100 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% 1.93*** 2.06*** 2.07*** 1.73** 1.66** 1.44* 
 (2.58) (2.69) (2.72) (2.35) (2.32) (1.89) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% × High_CII 1.85**     1.02 
 (2.21)     (1.12) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% × High_CLA  1.90***   
 1.14 
  (2.58)    (1.62) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% × High_CDC   1.60**   0.89 
   (1.97)   (1.12) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% × High_COC    2.00***  1.19* 
    (3.33)  (1.75) 
"%,_"#$!,#$% × High_ICM  
   2.77*** 1.92*** 
     (5.84) (3.84) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Parent - Parent predictability 
DV: 	+/&!,#*100 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% 1.11*** 1.33*** 1.29*** 1.15** 1.09*** 0.75** 
 (2.65) (2.85) (2.65) (2.52) (2.60) (2.06) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% × High_CII 0.32** 
    0.20 
 (2.22)     (1.24) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% × High_CLA  0.27**    0.16 
  (2.28)    (1.24) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% × High_CDC   0.23**   0.13 
   (2.06)   (1.14) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% × High_COC  
  0.50***  0.22 
    (2.94)  (1.62) 
"%,_)*+!,#$% × High_ICM     0.57*** 0.38*** 
     (4.53) (3.49) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 9: The rule of law and the activity of internal capital markets 
 
This table shows the impact of the country’s rule of law (ROL) on the activity of internal capital market (ICM) using 
Fama-MacBeth regressions while controlling for other mechanism for OLF return predictability. ROL in each of the 
23 developed countries is proxied by the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008). The OLFs have four 
types: subsidiary-parent (Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary (Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent 
(Par-Par). We include the interaction terms between the lagged subsidiaries’ returns, "#$!,#$%, the lagged parent 
firms’ returns, )*+!,#$%, the lagged sister subsidiaries’ returns, "%,_"#$!,#$%, or the lagged sister parent firms’ returns, 
"%,_)*+!,#$%, and four dummy variables reflecting four competing mechanisms: (1) investors’ inattention, (2) limits 
to arbitrage, (3) ownership complexity, (4) decision commonality, and (5) active internal capital markets at a time. 
All specific ownership predictors are shown with a generic name, D74!,#$%. The composite proxies for each of the 
first four mechanisms, composite investors’ inattention (CII), composite limits to arbitrage (CLA), composite 
decision commonality (CDC), composite ownership complexity (COC), the activity measure of ICM, as well as the 
dummy variables, High_CII, High_CLA, High_CDC, and High_COC are defined in Table 8. A dummy variable 
71V_.D7 is equal unity if OLFs are from countries with the anti-self-dealing index of below 0.5 and zero otherwise. 
All regressions also include the dummy variable itself and lagged control variables from Table 4 as well as country 
and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are not shown. Interactive terms Low_ ROL, High_ ICM × Low_ ROL, 
and D74!,#$% × Low_ ROL are also not shown. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are 
Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
DV: 	+/&!,#*100 Sub-Par Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
D74!,#$% × High_ICM × Low_ROL 1.10* 0.55* 0.62** 0.12* 
 (1.92) (1.68) (2.01) (1.66) 
D74!,#$% × High_ ICM  2.09*** 1.08** 1.36*** 0.25** 
 (3.13) (2.33) (3.06) (2.29) 
D74!,#$% 2.95* 1.74** 1.16* 0.78** 
 (1.71) (2.55) (1.92) (2.11) 
D74!,#$% × High_CII 0.70 0.51 0.55 0.10 
 (0.73) (0.84) (0.69) (0.76) 
D74!,#$% × High_CLA 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.08 
 (0.89) (0.90) (0.88) (0.70) 
D74!,#$% × High_CDC 0.66 0.41 0.45 0.07 
 (0.58) (0.63) (0.60) (0.65) 
D74!,#$% × High_COC 1.09 0.63 0.70 0.12 
 (1.10) (1.00) (1.03) (0.96) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
 
  





Plot A: An example of a multi-layer and multi-country ownership structure – Renault S.A. 
 
    
(1) Subsidiary-Parent (2) Parent-Subsidiary (3) Subsidiary-Subsidiary (4) Parent-Parent 
 
Plot B: Four types of ownership links 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of complex ownership links 
This figure shows complexity of ownership links. Plot A gives an example of multi-layer and multi-country 
ownership links based on Renault S.A. (Groupe Renault). Plot B gives four possible types of ownership links 
between parent firms (P) and subsidiaries (S), namely, two vertical ones: (1) subsidiary-parent, (2) parent- subsidiary; 
and two horizontal ones: (3) subsidiary-subsidiary (sister subsidiaries), connected through a common parent firm, 
and (4) parent-parent (sister parent firms), connected through a common subsidiary. Each ownership link can be 
direct (PD or SD) or indirect (PI or SI). A parent firm (subsidiary) is directly linked to a subsidiary (parent firm) if they 
are connected without an intermediate subsidiary (a parent firm). Similarly, sister subsidiaries (sister parent firms) 
are directly linked if they are connected through a parent firm (a subsidiary) without an intermediate subsidiary (a 
parent firm). For instance, Renault S.A. and Mitsubishi Corp. are indirect sister parent firms, since they have a 
common subsidiary (Mitsubishi Motors Corp.), but Renault S.A. holds Mitsubishi Motors through Nissan Motor Co., 
Ltd. Each parent firm (subsidiary) can be local or foreign and/or be in the same or different industry relative to the 
linked subsidiary (parent firm). 
Renault S.A.
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. Mitsubishi Corp.
Nissan Tokyo Sales 
Holdings Co., Ltd.Nissan Shatai Co., Ltd. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.


















Figure 2: Predictive coefficients of OLF before and after ownership links 
This figure shows the predictive OLF coefficients to real- and pseudo-focal firms before and after the change in 
ownership links based on Table 6 estimations, as well as their mean values before and after the event. The sample 
includes firms from 23 developed markets from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks 
priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. We identify all cases in which a firm without any 
ownership links transforms into a firm with at least one ownership link. This firms form our “Treatment” group for 
each ownership link (blue solid line with squares). For each real-focal firm, we select one pseudo-focal firm in the 
control group prior to the change in ownership links. It is a four-step procedure. First, we choose pseudo-focal firms 
which are in the same industry as the real-focal firm in two years prior to the change in ownership links. Second, we 
select ten most similar pseudo-focal firms to a given real-focal firm in two years prior to the change in ownership 
links based on the average ranking of four firm characteristics: size, book-to-market ratio, asset growth, and gross 
profitability. Third, we run the Fama-MacBeth regressions and compare the OLF predictive coefficients for the 
control group of firms with those of the “Treatment” group within two years prior to the status change. We use the 
same OLF to predict returns of both pseudo-focal and real-focal firms. Finally, we select most similar OLF predictive 
coefficient firms as matched pseudo-focal firms for each real-focal firm. This procedure gives us the “Control group” 
for each ownership link (red dashed line with circles). The shown coefficients from top left to right bottom plots are 
the point estimates of "#$!,#$%, )*+!,#$%, "%,_"#$!,#$%, and "%,_)*+!,#$%, respectively, from Table 6. 
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Table A.1 checks the strength of the documented OLF return predictability is stable over time. It 
shows the six-factor alphas of focal firms, a_FF6, of four OLF return predictability strategies for 
two time periods of equal duration: January 2006 – June 2012 and July 2012 – December 2018. 
In the first period, the value-weighted (equally-weighted) portfolio alphas of the four 
strategies—i.e., the Q5-Q1 spreads for subsidiary-parent, parent-subsidiary, subsidiary-subsidiary, 
and parent-parent ownership links—are 127 bps (141 bps), 78 bps (109 bps), 80 bps (112 bps), 
and 84 bps (99 bps) per month, respectively. The alphas of four strategies are all significant at the 
1% level. In the second period, the value-weighted (equally-weighted) portfolio alphas of the 
same four strategies are 101 bps (111 bps), 69 bps (96 bps), 72 bps (101 bps), and 73 bps (89 bps) 
per month, respectively. Except for one case, the alphas of all four strategies in all cases are again 
significant at the 1% level. The only occurrence of 5% significance is recorded for the 
value-weighted parent-subsidiary alpha in the second sub-period. Overall, we find very similar 
results between the two time periods in both economic and statistical terms, which implies a high 
consistency of the observed OLF return predictability phenomenon over time. 
Table A.2 show the six-factor alphas for four types of ownership links across five 
geographic regions based on the focal firms’ locations. There regions are Global excluding the 
United States, Japan, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America. In Panel B, for the 
subsidiary-parent return predictability, we observe that, although the a_FF6 values in various 
regions differ in magnitude, they all are statistically significant. Furthermore, the results show 
that North America has the highest alphas, 134 bps (value-weighted) and 153 bps 
(equally-weighted), while Japan has the lowest, 81 bps (value-weighted) and 92 bps 
(equal-weighed). In Panel C, we look at regional abnormal return patterns of parent-subsidiary 
return predictability. Again, with one exception, all focal firms’ alphas are significant at the 1% or 
5% levels. The lowest predictability is again found for Japan based on value-weighted portfolio 
returns—50 bps with 10% significance. Panels D and E report regional abnormal returns of 
return predictability between sister subsidiaries and between sister parent firms, respectively. The 
Q5-Q1 spread for six-factor alphas of subsidiary-subsidiary predictability in different regions 
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ranges from 53 bps to 122 bps, while that for these alphas of parent-parent predictability ranges 
from 57 bps to 108 bps. Across all estimations, the statistical significance of the Q5-Q1 spread in 
Panels D and E is high (at least the 5% level). 
Tables A.3 and A.4 show the univariate test results based on risk-adjusted returns and 
long-term portfolio alphas as in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, with the Burt and Hrdlicka (2020) 
adjustment. To construct these tables, we use portfolio returns computed from idiosyncratic 
returns of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) rather than their raw returns to sort focal firms into 
quintile portfolios at time -. In Panel A of Tables A.3 and A.4, we use the abnormal returns from 
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, a_FF5, while in Panel B – from the Fama and 
French (2018) six-factor model, a_FF6.  
In Table A.3 we observe that the magnitudes of both types of alphas across both panels are 
slightly smaller than the corresponding values reported in Table 2. However, all Q5-Q1 spread 
portfolio returns are still significant at 5% or 1% levels. In Table A.4 we again observe a 
monotonic decrease in economic and statistical predictability over time across all four types of 
ownership links. The point estimates and their statistical significance are only marginally smaller 
than in Table 3. These results reveal that both at short and long horizons the information derived 
from the raw returns of firms with OLFs is mostly orthogonal to the firms’ common exposure to 
asset pricing factor returns. 
Tables A.5 and A.6 show the results of OLF return predictability tests in emerging markets 
using univariate portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions, respectively. The estimations are 
conducted using the Fama and French five-factor and six-factor alphas. Emerging markets 
includes 26 markets from the K. French’s data library, namely: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates. As can be seen in Table A.5, OLFs generate 
significant Q5–Q1 alpha spread in emerging markets. Note that these abnormal returns are larger 
in magnitude than the corresponding spreads in developed markets in Table 2. This is expected 
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given the lower efficiency of emerging markets. These results reveal that the OLF return 
predictability is a common phenomenon in global markets. 
A reader might still think that firm’s ownership links pick up some unobserved economic 
relations beyond supplier-customer firm links studied in Cohen and Frazzini (2008). We address 
this concern by repeating our estimations on a sample of financial firms from 23 developed 
markets. These firms differ from those in all other industries by the lack of explicit economic 
linkages. Tables A.7 and A.8 show the results of OLF return predictability tests among financial 
firms using univariate portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions, respectively. The 
estimations are again shown for the Fama-French five-factor and six-factor alphas. Our results in 
economic and statistical terms are very similar to those in Tables 2 and 4. Therefore, we can 
conclude that any possible economic links among firms with ownership links do not impact the 
OLF return predictability evidence. 
Table A.9 shows whether the OLF return predictability disappears after controlling for 
previously reported inter-firm momentum effects. We include the following ten inter-firm 
momentum variables: (1) supplier industry returns and (2) customer industry returns (Menzly and 
Ozbas, 2010); (3) customers’ returns (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008); (4) “pseudo-conglomerate” 
portfolio returns (Cohen and Lou, 2012); (5) strategic alliance partners’ returns (Cao et al., 2016); 
(6) technological partners’ returns (Lee et al., 2019); (7) geographic peers’ returns (Parsons et al., 
2020); (8) firm returns with common board members (Burt et al., 2020); (9) shared analyst 
coverage peers’ returns (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2020); and (10) common institutional investors peers’ 
returns (Gao et al., 2017). We limit this analysis to the US firm sample only due to the fact that 
those above mentioned inter-firm momentum variables are not available for non-US firms. We 
only estimate subsidiary-parent and parent-subsidiary return predictabilities using the US firm 
sample, since there are rare cases of sister subsidiaries and sister parent firms in the United States. 
We also add but do not report control variables from Table 4 in all regressions. Column (1) in 
reports the basic results without inter-firm link controls. Columns (2-12) show that the OLF 
return predictability is not subsumed by any of the ten existing inter-firm links when they enter 
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regressions individually. Therefore, we conclude that the OLF return predictability cannot be 
subsumed by previously reported inter-firm links. 
Table A.10 reports panel regression results of the predictive power of OLFs for focal firms’ 
three fundamental performance measures – cash flow growth, profit growth, and growth in return 
on assets (ROA). All three dependent variables are the market-adjusted. The control variables are 
the same as those in Table 4. Furthermore, along with country and industry fixed effects, we also 
include the year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by year. Due to space constraints, 
the coefficients on control variables and fixed effects are not reported. All variables are taken at 
the end of each calendar year, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and are cross-sectionally 
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. Panel A reports the tests for predicting cash 
flow growth of focal firms, DCF. In this case, we regress the annual cash flow growth of focal 
firms on both the contemporaneous and lagged one year average cash flow growth of their OLF 
across the four possible categories: !"#_∆CI#, :12_∆CI#, !$D_!"#_∆CI#, and !$D_:12_∆CI#. 
Panel B shows the test results for predicting profit growth of focal firms, DP. Here, we regress 
the annual profit growth of focal firms on both the contemporaneous and lagged one year average 
profit growth of their OLF—namely, !"#_∆:#, :12_∆:#, !$D_!"#_∆:#, and !$D_:12_∆:#. All 
estimated coefficients, both contemporaneous and predictive, across both panels are significant at 
least at the 1% or 5% level. Panel C shows the test results for predicting ROA growth, DROA. 
Here, we regress the annual profit growth of focal firms on both the contemporaneous and lagged 
one year average profit growth of their OLF—namely, !"#_∆+(S# , :12_∆+(S# , 
!$D_!"#_∆+(S# , and !$D_:12_∆+(S# . We observe that again all slope coefficients, both 
contemporaneous and predictive, are significant at 1% or 5% levels. Therefore, the test results in 
Table A.10 suggest that OLF are fundamentally related to each other, and there are 
multidimensional performance links among such firms.  
Finally, Tables A.11 and A.12 show that OLF returns can forecast revenue and sales 
surprises of the focal firm, respectively. The setting of these tables is similar to that of Table 5. 
Panel A reports the overall results for one-quarter predictability for four OLF investment 
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strategies. The dependent variable in Table A.11 is !W+!,# – the unexpected revenue of focal 
firm $ at time -, while that in Table A.12 is !W!!,# – the unexpected sales of focal firm $ at 
time -. The independent variable of interest is the one-quarter lagged return of OLFs, computed 
from the preceding three months. Besides standard firm controls form Table 4 and country and 
industry fixed effects, we also include the focal firm’s own corresponding lagged standardized 
unexpected measure (up to four quarters). All independent variables are distributed to deciles 
ranging from zero to one. The dependent variable is winsorized in the cross-section at 1% and 
99%. We find that the returns of OLFs predict focal firms’ future unexpected revenue and sales. 
In Panels B through E of Table A.11 (Table A.12), we test the unexpected revenue (sales) 
predictability over longer periods – up to four quarters ahead. The dependent variable in these 
panels is !W+!,#12  or !W!!,#12  of the focal firm, where V = 0, 1, 2, 3. We find that all 
coefficients of lagged returns of OLFs, for all four possible ownership links in all panels, are 
positive, but their economic and statistical significance, as in Table 5-B, decreases from Quarter 1 
to Quarter 4, that is, the forecasting power decays over time. 
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Table A.1: Sub-period tests of the OLF return predictability 
 
This table shows the Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas for value-weighted (VW) and equally-weighted (EW) 
univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms for ownership-linked firms (OLFs) in sub-periods. The sample includes firms 
from 23 developed markets from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 
at the portfolio formation date are excluded. The results are shown for four types of OLFs: subsidiary-parent 
(Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary (Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). The 
risk-adjusted returns are computed as in Table 3. The alphas are reported for two equal sub-periods (January 2006 to 
June 2012 and July 2012 to December 2018) for the lowest and highest quintile portfolios and the Q5-Q1 difference 
portfolio based on four OLF trading strategies. For each quintile portfolio, the board overlap is split at the median 
into low and high subsamples. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted 
with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sub-Par Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
VW 1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 
Q1 (Low) -0.91** -0.72** -0.48* -0.43* -0.48* -0.43* -0.49* -0.42* 
Q5 (High) 0.36* 0.28* 0.29* 0.26* 0.32* 0.29* 0.35* 0.31* 
Q5 – Q1 1.27*** 1.01*** 0.78*** 0.69** 0.80*** 0.72*** 0.84*** 0.73*** 
  (4.12) (3.28) (2.62) (2.29) (2.95) (2.67) (2.93) (2.58) 
EW         
Q1 (Low) -1.01*** -0.79** -0.68** -0.60** -0.67** -0.61** -0.57** -0.52** 
Q5 (High) 0.40* 0.31* 0.40* 0.36* 0.45* 0.40* 0.42* 0.37* 
Q5 – Q1 1.41*** 1.11*** 1.09*** 0.96*** 1.12*** 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.89*** 
  (4.54) (3.61) (3.65) (3.23) (4.12) (3.76) (3.47) (3.10) 
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Table A.2: Sub-regional tests of the OLF return predictability 
 
This table shows the Fama and French (2018) six-factor abnormal returns for value-weighted (VW) and 
equally-weighted (EW) univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms in different regional samples for ownership-linked 
firms (OLFs). The sample includes firms from 23 developed markets from January 2006 to December 2018. All 
financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. The risk-adjusted returns 
are computed based on the developed market factors from the K. French data library. Panels A-D show univariate 
portfolio sorts for four OLF strategies in different regions: Global ex USA, Japan, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North 
America. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Subsidiary – Parent predictability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VW Global ex USA Japan Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Q1 (Low) -0.76** -0.58** -0.62** -0.89** -0.96** 
Q5 (High) 0.29* 0.23 0.24 0.34* 0.38* 
Q5 – Q1 1.06*** 0.81*** 0.87*** 1.23*** 1.34*** 
  (3.42) (2.63) (2.81) (4.01) (4.35) 
EW      
Q1 (Low) -0.87** -0.66** -0.69** -1.02*** -1.10*** 
Q5 (High) 0.34* 0.26* 0.27* 0.40* 0.43* 
Q5 – Q1 1.21*** 0.92*** 0.96*** 1.42*** 1.53*** 
  (3.90) (2.96) (3.14) (4.57) (4.96) 
 
Panel B: Parent – Subsidiary predictability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VW  Global ex USA Japan Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Q1 (Low) -0.49* -0.31* -0.51** -0.47* -0.38* 
Q5 (High) 0.29* 0.19 0.30* 0.28* 0.23 
Q5 – Q1 0.78** 0.50* 0.81*** 0.75** 0.61** 
  (2.57) (1.68) (2.73) (2.52) (2.05) 
EW      
Q1 (Low) -0.70** -0.46* -0.71** -0.68** -0.55** 
Q5 (High) 0.42* 0.27* 0.42* 0.40* 0.32* 
Q5 – Q1 1.12*** 0.73** 1.13*** 1.08*** 0.87*** 
  (3.67) (2.45) (3.76) (3.63) (2.92) 
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Table A.2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Subsidiary – Subsidiary predictability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VW  Global ex USA Japan Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Q1 (Low) -0.48* -0.32* -0.53** -0.47* -0.35* 
Q5 (High) 0.32* 0.21 0.35* 0.32* 0.24 
Q5 – Q1 0.81*** 0.53** 0.88*** 0.79*** 0.59** 
  (3.00) (1.96) (3.26) (2.91) (2.16) 
EW      
Q1 (Low) -0.68** -0.45* -0.73** -0.68** -0.53** 
Q5 (High) 0.46* 0.30* 0.49* 0.45* 0.36* 
Q5 – Q1 1.14*** 0.76*** 1.22*** 1.14*** 0.89*** 
  (4.21) (2.80) (4.51) (4.21) (3.27) 
 
Panel D: Parent – Parent predictability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VW Global ex USA Japan Asia-Pacific Europe North America 
Q1 (Low) -0.45* -0.33* -0.37* -0.50** -0.54** 
Q5 (High) 0.33* 0.24 0.26* 0.37* 0.39* 
Q5 – Q1 0.78*** 0.57** 0.64** 0.87*** 0.93*** 
  (2.72) (2.00) (2.21) (3.03) (3.24) 
EW      
Q1 (Low) -0.53** -0.39* -0.44* -0.59** -0.63** 
Q5 (High) 0.38* 0.28* 0.32* 0.42* 0.45* 
Q5 – Q1 0.91*** 0.67** 0.76*** 1.01*** 1.08*** 
  (3.17) (2.34) (2.67) (3.51) (3.76) 
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Table A.3: Univariate portfolio sorts after correcting bias 
 
This table shows the calendar-time portfolio returns using the Burt and Hrdlicka (2020) adjustment for 
value-weighted (VW) and equally-weighted (EW) univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms for four types of return 
predictabilities in ownership-linked firms (OLFs): parent-subsidiary, subsidiary-parent, subsidiary- subsidiary, and 
parent-parent. The sample includes firms from 23 developed markets from January 2006 to December 2018. All 
financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. To construct this table, we 
use portfolio returns computed using OLF idiosyncratic returns rather than their raw returns to sort focal firms into 
quintile portfolios. Panel A reports abnormal returns for the lowest (Q1) and highest (Q5) quintile portfolios as well 
as the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Panel B reports abnormal 
returns for lowest and highest quintile portfolios as well as the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and 
French (2018) six-factor model. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) are computed based on the developed 
market factors from the K. French data library. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are 
Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.64** -0.43* -0.36* -0.48* 
Q5 (High) 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.33* 
Q5 – Q1 0.87*** 0.72** 0.58** 0.81*** 
  (2.81) (2.47) (2.20) (2.82) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.68** -0.60** -0.51** -0.56** 
Q5 (High) 0.25 0.40* 0.32* 0.39* 
Q5 – Q1 0.94*** 1.00*** 0.84*** 0.95*** 
  (3.04) (3.45) (3.13) (3.28) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.62** -0.40* -0.38* -0.43* 
Q5 (High) 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.32* 
Q5 – Q1 0.86*** 0.64** 0.64** 0.75*** 
  (2.81) (2.17) (2.34) (2.65) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.68** -0.56** -0.54** -0.50** 
Q5 (High) 0.27 0.33* 0.36* 0.36* 
Q5 – Q1 0.95*** 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 
  (3.09) (2.96) (3.29) (3.02) 
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Table A.4: Long-term portfolio alphas after correcting bias 
 
This table shows the long-term portfolio alphas using the Burt and Hrdlicka (2020) adjustment for value-weighted 
univariate portfolio sorts of focal firms for four types of return predictabilities in ownership-linked firms (OLFs): 
parent-subsidiary, subsidiary-parent, subsidiary-subsidiary, and parent-parent. The sample includes firms from 23 
developed markets from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the 
portfolio formation date are excluded. To construct this table, we use portfolio returns computed using OLF 
idiosyncratic returns rather than their raw returns to sort focal firms into quintile portfolios. The table reports 
monthly five-factor alphas and six-factor alphas for Q5-Q1 difference portfolio from two to six months ahead after 
portfolio formation. Panel A reports the abnormal returns for the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fame and 
French (2015) five-factor model. Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the 
Fame and French (2018) six-factor model. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) are computed based on the 
developed market factors from the K. French data library. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors 
are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fame and French (2015) five-factor Q5-Q1 difference portfolio alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
t + 2 0.77** 0.65** 0.51** 0.70** 
 (2.39) (2.19) (1.97) (2.48) 
t + 3 0.69** 0.55* 0.44* 0.63** 
 (2.25) (1.87) (1.73) (2.13) 
t + 4 0.60* 0.49* 0.39 0.53** 
 (1.85) (1.67) (1.46) (1.97) 
t + 5 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.46 
 (1.58) (1.43) (1.28) (1.58) 
t + 6 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.40 
 (1.35) (1.12) (1.02) (1.37) 
 
Panel B: Fame and French (2018) six-factor Q5-Q1 difference portfolio alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
t + 2 0.74** 0.55* 0.55** 0.65** 
 (2.41) (1.91) (2.03) (2.38) 
t + 3 0.65** 0.50* 0.51* 0.58** 
 (2.16) (1.67) (1.78) (2.10) 
t + 4 0.58* 0.42 0.43 0.50* 
 (1.89) (1.47) (1.63) (1.74) 
t + 5 0.50* 0.38 0.38 0.45 
 (1.66) (1.28) (1.36) (1.51) 
t + 6 0.42 0.29 0.31 0.35 
 (1.39) (1.06) (1.06) (1.31) 
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Table A.5: Univariate portfolio sorts in emerging markets 
 
This table shows the emerging market results of value-weighted (VW) and equally-weighted (EW) univariate 
portfolio sorts for four types of return predictabilities in ownership-linked firms (OLFs): parent-subsidiary, 
subsidiary-parent, subsidiary-subsidiary, and parent-parent. There are 26 emerging markets in K. French’ data library: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates. The sample period is from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial 
firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. Panel A reports abnormal returns for 
the lowest (Q1) and highest (Q5) quintile portfolios as well as the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model in emerging markets. Panel B reports abnormal returns for lowest and highest 
quintile portfolios as well as the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model in 
emerging markets. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) are computed based on the emerging market factors 
from the K. French data library. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted 
with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.98** -0.54** -0.53** -0.71** 
Q5 (High) 0.37* 0.45* 0.34* 0.43* 
Q5 – Q1 1.35*** 0.99*** 0.86*** 1.14*** 
  (4.44) (3.52) (3.23) (3.91) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -1.12*** -0.96** -0.92** -0.77** 
Q5 (High) 0.37* 0.61** 0.56** 0.58** 
Q5 – Q1 1.49*** 1.57*** 1.49*** 1.34*** 
  (4.71) (5.43) (5.52) (4.71) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -1.02*** -0.72** -0.61** -0.65** 
Q5 (High) 0.39* 0.36* 0.38* 0.42* 
Q5 – Q1 1.41*** 1.08*** 0.99*** 1.08*** 
  (4.55) (3.47) (3.65) (3.76) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -1.24*** -0.79** -0.97** -0.74** 
Q5 (High) 0.43* 0.54** 0.52** 0.46* 
Q5 – Q1 1.68*** 1.33*** 1.49*** 1.20*** 
  (5.34) (4.56) (5.33) (4.13) 
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Table A.6: Multivariate regressions in emerging markets 
 
This table shows the estimation results from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for four trading 
strategies of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) in 26 emerging markets from K. French’ data library: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE. 
The sample period is from January 2006 to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the 
portfolio formation date are excluded. The dependent variable in Panel A the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
alpha, 3_445; in Panel B – the Fama and French (2018) six-factor alpha, 3_446. The explanatory variables include 
the lagged one-month portfolio returns of OLFs ("#$!,#$%, )*+!,#$%, "%,_"#$!,#$%, or "%,_)*+!,#$%) as well as all 
other controls from Table 4, i.e., firm size, book-to-market ratio, focal firm’s own lagged monthly return, 
medium-term price momentum, asset growth, gross profitability, stock turnover, and industry momentum. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix, are based on last non-missing available observation for each month & and are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are 
not shown. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: 3_445!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 6.52***    
 (3.45)    
)*+!,#$%  4.22***   
  (4.13)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   3.10***  
   (3.98)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    2.04*** 
    (4.08) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 43,458 72,910 47,600 18,160 
R2 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: 3_446!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 5.47***    
 (3.14)    
)*+!,#$%  4.50***   
  (4.84)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   2.95***  
   (2.77)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    2.09*** 
    (4.33) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 43,458 72,910 47,600 18,160 
R2 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 
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Table A.7: Univariate portfolio sorts for financial sector firms 
 
This table shows the financial sector results of value- and equal-weighted univariate portfolio sorts for four types of 
return predictabilities in ownership-linked firms (OLFs): parent-subsidiary, subsidiary-parent, subsidiary-subsidiary, 
and parent-parent. There are 23 developed markets from January 2006 to December 2018. Stocks with prices less 
than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. Panel A reports abnormal returns for the lowest (Q1) and highest 
(Q5) quintile portfolios as well as the Q5-Q1 difference portfolio using the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
model. Panel B reports abnormal returns for lowest and highest quintile portfolios as well as the Q5-Q1 difference 
portfolio using the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns (alphas) are 
computed based on the developed market factors from the K. French data library. The t-statistics are in parentheses 
and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.61** -0.37* -0.32* -0.39* 
Q5 (High) 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.26 
Q5 – Q1 0.82*** 0.61** 0.52** 0.65** 
  (2.91) (2.18) (2.07) (2.41) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.64** -0.52** -0.44* -0.43* 
Q5 (High) 0.24 0.34* 0.28* 0.31* 
Q5 – Q1 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 
  (3.04) (3.15) (2.99) (2.89) 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alphas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VW Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
Q1 (Low) -0.59** -0.34* -0.32* -0.34* 
Q5 (High) 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.24 
Q5 – Q1 0.83*** 0.55* 0.53** 0.58** 
  (2.84) (1.96) (2.19) (2.21) 
EW     
Q1 (Low) -0.68** -0.46* -0.48* -0.38* 
Q5 (High) 0.25 0.28* 0.31* 0.28* 
Q5 – Q1 0.93*** 0.73*** 0.80*** 0.66** 
  (3.10) (2.63) (3.04) (2.54) 
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Table A.8: Multivariate regressions for financial sector firms 
 
This table shows the estimation results from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for four trading 
strategies of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) in the financial sector. There are 23 developed markets from January 
2006 to December 2018. Stocks with prices less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. The dependent 
variable in Panel A is the risk-adjusted return from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model, 3_445; in Panel 
B – the risk-adjusted return from the Fama and French (2018) six-factor model, 3_446. The explanatory variables 
include the lagged one-month portfolio returns of OLFs ("#$!,#$%, )*+!,#$%, "%,_"#$!,#$%, or "%,_)*+!,#$%) as well 
as all other controls from Table 3, i.e., firm size, book-to-market ratio, focal firm’s own lagged monthly return, 
medium-term price momentum, asset growth, gross profitability, stock turnover, and industry momentum. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix, are based on last non-missing available observation for each month &, and are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are 
not shown. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fama and French (2015) five-factor alpha 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: 3_445!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 2.71*    
 (1.91)    
)*+!,#$%  1.54**   
  (2.20)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   1.15*  
   (1.72)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    0.71** 
    (2.21) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 26,421 46,722 23,488 8,120 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 
Panel B: Fama and French (2018) six-factor alpha 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: 3_446!,#*100 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
"#$!,#$% 2.41*    
 (1.70)    
)*+!,#$%  1.72**   
  (2.36)   
"%,_"#$!,#$%   1.11  
   (1.59)  
"%,_)*+!,#$%    0.80** 
    (2.37) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 26,421 46,722 23,488 8,120 
R2 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 
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Table A.9: Tests with alternative inter-firm momentum links 
 
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of the OLF predictability in the presence of alternative 
inter-firm momentum variables for the US sample. The sample period is from January 2006 to December 2018. The 
dependent variable (multiplied by 100) is the monthly excess return of the focal firm. The independent variable of 
interest is "#$!,#$% and )*+!,#$%. "#W_B8C!,#$% and M#,_B8C!,#$% are the lagged supplier industry momentum and 
customer industry momentum of the focal firm (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010); M#,!,#$% is the lagged the customer 
momentum of the focal firm (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008); )M!,#$% is the lagged pseudo-conglomerate portfolio return 
of the focal firm (Cohen and Lou, 2012); ">!,#$% is lagged strategic alliance partners’ portfolio return of the focal 
firm (Cao et al., 2016); @/Xℎ!,#$% is the lagged technological partners’ portfolio return of the focal firm (Lee et al., 
2019);	?/1!,#$% is the lagged average return of all other stocks headquartered in the same city of US 20 largest cities 
(Parsons et al., 2020). M<!,#$% is the lagged weighted-average return of stocks connected through common board 
members with the focal firm (Burt et al., 2020). M>!,#$% is the lagged weighted-average return of stocks connected 
through common analyst coverage with the focal firm (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2020). MB!,#$%  is the lagged 
weighted-average return of stocks connected through common institutional investors with the focal firm (Gao et al., 
2017). Control variables are from Table 4, but their coefficients and those of industry fixed effects are not reported. 
The standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with six lags. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table A.9 (continued) 
 
Panel A: Subsidiary-Parent predictability 
DV: Excess returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
!"#!,#$% 2.77*** 2.08*** 1.88*** 1.52** 1.94*** 2.06** 1.97*** 1.83*** 1.78** 2.13*** 2.08*** 2.03*** 
 (3.25) (2.88) (2.98) (2.45) (2.59) (2.53) (2.71) (2.99) (2.57) (2.86) (2.81) (2.81) 
!"$_&'(!,#$%  1.54**  1.25*         
  (2.35)  (1.88)         
)"*_&'(!,#$%   1.98** 1.65**         
   (2.42) (2.09)         
)"*!,#$%     1.83*        
     (1.94)        
+)!,#$%      1.77**       
      (2.01)       
!,!,#$%       1.16**      
       (2.21)      
-./ℎ!,#$%        1.82**     
        (2.20)     
1.2!,#$%         1.20*    
         (1.86)    
)3!,#$%          1.51*   
          (1.80)   
),!,#$%           1.04**  
           (2.01)  
)&!,#$%            1.68** 
            (2.15) 
Controls & Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 14,040 11,985 11,985 11,985 4,045 4,167 3,953 4,667 12,287 5,691 8,673 9,916 
R& 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
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Table A.9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Parent-Subsidiary predictability 
DV: Excess returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
+56!,#$% 2.12*** 1.51** 1.35** 1.15** 1.70** 1.35** 1.48** 1.70** 1.39** 1.62** 1.62** 1.50** 
 (2.68) (2.32) (2.17) (2.02) (2.42) (2.22) (2.03) (2.39) (2.21) (2.14) (2.03) (2.05) 
!"$_&'(!,#$%  1.12*  0.90         
  (1.79)  (1.57)         
)"*_&'(!,#$%   1.03* 0.77*         
   (1.84) (1.70)         
)"*!,#$%     0.57**        
     (2.43)        
+)!,#$%      0.69**       
      (2.47)       
!,!,#$%       1.15**      
       (2.05)      
-./ℎ!,#$%        1.42**     
        (2.23)     
1.2!,#$%         0.89**    
         (2.21)    
)3!,#$%          0.63*   
          (1.92)   
),!,#$%           0.78**  
           (2.27)  
)&!,#$%            1.06 
            (1.54) 
Controls & Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 17,004 14,315 14,315 14,315 4,146 4,240 4,053 4,934 13,377 6,092 10,204 10,810 
R& 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
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Table A.10: Forecasting growth in cash flow, profit, and ROA growth 
 
This table shows panel regression results of the predictive power of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) for focal 
firms’ two fundamental performance measures (F): cash flow growth (DCF) in Panel A, profit growth (DP) in 
Panel B, and ROA growth in Panel C. The sample includes firms from 23 developed markets from January 2006 
to December 2018. All financial firms and stocks priced less than $5 at the portfolio formation date are excluded. 
Variables !"#_∆&! , '()_∆&! , !*+_!"#_∆&! , and !*+_'()_∆&!  are the average growth in each of the two 
performance measures for four types of OLFs. All variables are taken at the end of each calendar year and 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. Independent variables are cross-sectionally standardized to have zero mean 
and unit variance. Control variables are from Table 4 and are defined in the Appendix. All regressions include 
country (C), industry (I), and year (Y) fixed effects, but their estimates are not shown. The standard errors are 
clustered by year. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Predicting cash flow growth of focal firms 
 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary Parent 
DV: DCF t t + 1 t t + 1 t t + 1 t t + 1 
!"#_∆,&! 0.494*** 0.147***       
 (8.28) (3.71)       
'()_∆,&!   0.216*** 0.049***     
   (6.88) (3.14)     
!*+_!"#_∆,&!     0.179*** 0.061***   
     (5.39) (3.65)   
!*+_'()_∆,&!       0.028*** 0.006** 
       (4.29) (2.15) 
∆,&!  0.306***  0.100***  0.154***  0.012** 
  (4.67)  (4.49)  (5.01)  (2.46) 
Controls, C, I & Y FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 16,731 15,444 28,704 26,496 17,739 16,374 6,391 5,899 
R2 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 
 
Panel B: Predicting profit growth of focal firms 
 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary  Parent 
DV: DProfits t t + 1 t t + 1 t t + 1 t t + 1 
!"#_∆'! 0.575*** 0.167***       
 (8.49) (5.05)       
'()_∆'!   0.217*** 0.072***     
   (6.49) (2.97)     
!*+_!"#_∆'!     0.134*** 0.050***   
     (5.33) (3.24)   
!*+_'()_∆'!       0.084*** 0.025** 
       (4.17) (2.54) 
∆'!  0.421***  0.160***  0.114***  0.057*** 
  (5.37)  (3.62)  (3.65)  (3.78) 
Controls, C, I & Y FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 16,731 15,444 28,704 26,496 17,739 16,374 6,391 5,899 
R2 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
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Table A.10 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Predicting ROA growth of focal firms 
 Parent Subsidiary Subsidiary  Parent 
DV: DROA t t + 1 t t + 1 t t + 1 t t + 1 
!"#_∆-./! 0.553*** 0.140*** 
      
 (7.99) (4.74)       
'()_∆-./!   0.210*** 0.052***     
   (6.74) (3.48)     
!*+_!"#_∆-./!     0.126*** 0.030***   
     (4.89) (2.96)   
!*+_'()_∆-./!       0.012*** 0.005** 
       (4.08) (2.50) 
∆-./!  0.281***  0.121***  0.070***  0.010*** 
  (4.92)  (4.13)  (3.42)  (2.76) 
Controls, C, I & Y FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 16,731 15,444 28,704 26,496 17,739 16,374 6,391 5,899 
R2 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559099
22 
 
Table A.11: Forecasting revenue surprises 
 
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of the predictability of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) 
for standardized unexpected revenues (SURs). The SURs are calculated as the yearly change in quarterly 
revenues scaled by the standard deviation of unexpected revenues over the eight past quarters. The explanatory 
variables include the preceding three months portfolio returns of OLFs, .0&",!$% (i.e., !"#",!$%, '()",!$%, 
!*+_!"#",!$%, or !*+_'()",!$%). The results are reported for four types of OLF predictability: subsidiary-parent 
(Sub-Par), parent-subsidiary (Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). All the 
independent variables are distributed to deciles and scaled from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is winsorized at 1% 
and 99% levels in the cross-section. The control variables are from Table 4 as well as one- to four-quarter lags of 
the firm’s own SURs. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are not 
shown. Panel A reports regression results for the next quarter’s SURs. Panel B reports regression results of future 
SURs for the next four fiscal quarters. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West 
adjusted with four lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: One-quarter ahead forecast  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: !1-",! *100 Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
.0&",!$% 1.48*** 1.33*** 0.96*** 1.35*** 
 (2.78) (5.59) (3.22) (3.69) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 35,650 61,162 37,798 13,618 
R2 0.41 0.55 0.33 0.41 
 
Panel B: Extended forecast 
DV: !1-",!&' k = 0, 1, 2, 3 Quarter 1  Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Subsidiary – Parent predictability     
!"#",!$% 1.48*** 1.15** 0.85 0.53 
 (2.78) (2.35) (1.46) (0.91) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Parent – Subsidiary predictability     
'()",!$% 1.33*** 1.05*** 0.64** 0.31 
 (5.59) (4.44) (2.43) (1.48) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Subsidiary – Subsidiary predictability     
!*+_!"#",!$% 0.96*** 0.66** 0.37 0.16 
 (3.22) (2.01) (1.18) (0.47) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Parent – Parent predictability     
!*+_'()",!$% 1.35*** 0.82** 0.43 0.19 
 (3.69) (2.45) (1.32) (0.58) 
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Table A.12: Forecasting sales surprises 
 
This table shows the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of the predictability of ownership-linked firms (OLFs) 
for standardized unexpected sales (SUSs). The SUSs are calculated as the yearly change in quarterly sales scaled 
by the standard deviation of unexpected sales over the eight past quarters. The explanatory variables include the 
preceding three months portfolio returns of OLFs, .0&",!$%  (i.e., !"#",!$% , '()",!$% , !*+_!"#",!$% , or 
!*+_'()",!$%). The results are reported for four types of OLF predictability: subsidiary-parent (Sub-Par), 
parent-subsidiary (Par-Sub), subsidiary-subsidiary (Sub-Sub), and parent-parent (Par-Par). All the independent 
variables are distributed to deciles and scaled from 0 to 1. The dependent variable is winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels in the cross-section. The control variables are from Table 4 as well as one- to four-quarter lags of the 
firm’s own SUSs. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects, but their estimates are not shown. 
Panel A reports regression results for the next quarter’s SUSs. Panel B reports regression results of future SUSs 
for the next four fiscal quarters. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the standard errors are Newey-West 
adjusted with four lags. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: One-quarter ahead forecast  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: !1!",! *100 Sub-Par  Par-Sub Sub-Sub Par-Par 
.0&",!$% 1.15** 1.18*** 0.66** 1.01*** 
 (2.37) (5.25) (2.10) (3.36) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 35,650 61,162 37,798 13,618 
R2 0.52 0.47 0.33 0.46 
 
Panel B: Extended forecast 
DV: !1!",!&' k = 0, 1, 2, 3 Quarter 1  Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Subsidiary – Parent predictability     
!"#",!$% 1.15** 0.91** 0.66 0.42 
 (2.37) (1.99) (1.29) (0.82) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Parent – Subsidiary predictability     
'()",!$% 1.18*** 0.87*** 0.49** 0.29 
 (5.25) (4.09) (2.17) (1.49) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Subsidiary – Subsidiary predictability     
!*+_!"#",!$% 0.66** 0.44 0.20 0.12 
 (2.10) (1.37) (0.82) (0.27) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
Parent – Parent predictability     
!*+_'()",!$% 1.01*** 0.63** 0.31 0.19 
 (3.36) (2.26) (1.12) (0.35) 
Controls, Country & Industry FEs Y Y Y Y 
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